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THE NEW QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION: 
NEW YORK'S REVIVAL OF A DOCTRINE 
WHOSE Tn/IE HAS PASSED 
Michael B. Mushlin* 
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer u. 
Heitnerl "reshaped the landscape of personal juri~diction."~ The 
news that the Court had rejected the centuries-old doctrine that 
quasi in rem jurisdiction could be based on the mere presence of 
property within a state "reverberated from the conference rooms 
of corporate headquarters to the halls of a~ademe."~ Prior to 
Shaffer, every jurisdiction in the United States had employed 
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433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
Note, Has ShafTer v. Heitner Been Lost a t  Sea?, 46 LA. L REV. 141 (198.5). 
Silberman, ShafTer v. Heitner: The End of a n  EM, 53 N.Y.U. L REV. 33 (1978). 
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quasi in rern jurisdiction without serious que~tion.~ 
Quasi in rern jurisdiction is a device by which a party uses a 
defendant's property to obtain judicial power to adjudicate a 
claim.Wnlike in personam jurisdiction: quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion depends upon pre-judgment attachment of the property,? 
and has only limited res judicata effecL8 However, before Shaf- 
R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 489 
(1952). Prior to Shaffer, according to Professor Millar, attachment jurisdiction had 
"blossomed and flourished, to become an almost indispensable constituent of our proco- 
dural systems." Id. at  481. See also C. DRAKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OP SUITS DY AT- 
TACHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (7th ed. 1891) (citing Pyrolusite M. Co. V. Ward, 73 
Ga. 491,492 (1884), for the proposition that "[nlo one ever dreamed that the attachmont 
laws of the several States authorizing attachments against non-resident defendants, woro 
violative of the Constitution of the United States. Argument is unnecessary."). 
Silberman, supra note 3, a t  39. 
There are two types of quasi in rern jurisdiction. The first, specific property disputo 
jurisdiction, determines the ownership of the property in a dispute between two or moro 
defined parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS $ 6 comment a (1982). Quasi in 
rern jurisdiction of the first type is used most frequently "in actions to partition land, 
quiet title, or foreclose mortgages." Silberman, supra note 3, at  39. What distinguishes 
quasi in rern jurisdiction of the first type from in rern jurisdiction is that in rern jurisdic- 
tion determines ownership of property as against the whole world, while a quasi in rern 
jurisdiction judgment applies only to defined parties. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at  199 11.17. 
The second, and by far the more controversial type, general dispute jurisdiction, 
involves the use of property not to determine its ownership, but rather to serve as tho 
basis for the litigation of some other dispute between the parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS § 8(l)(d) (1982). A distinguishing characteristic of quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion of the second type is that with i t  the plaintiff concedes the defendant's ownership of 
the attached property, and uses that ownership as the basis for the assertion of jurisdic- 
tion. Shaffer, 433 US.. at  199 n.17. 
In personam jurisdiction refers to obtaining judicial power over a person such that 
the judgment is fully binding and enforceable against him or her. See generally RESTATE- 
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 5 Comment b (1982). 
See note 198 and accompanying text infra. Attachment serves two purposes. First, 
i t  provides a means of assuring that the defendant is given notice of the action. Second, 
since jurisdiction is based on the presence of the property within the state, attachmont 
provides a safeguard to the court in that it retains jurisdiction over the action through- 
out its adjudication. Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t  198 n.16. For a discussion of the significance of 
this requirement, see notes 198-222 and accompanying text infra. 
If the defendant defaults, the final judgment rendered in a quasi in rom action 
does not "bind the defendant to any personal liability," but only determines his liability 
to the value of the thing attached. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 32(2) (1982). 
If, however, the defendant enters a limited appearance, the judgment may havo an issuo 
preclusion or collateral estoppel, although not a res judicata effect. Id. at  32(3); see also 
Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 17-18, 112 N.E. 500,502 (1916). For a 
discussion of the differing approaches to this problem, see notes 225, 227, 231 and ac- 
companying text infra. 
The term "limited appearance" refers to a procedure in which the defendant is givon 
the option to appear to defend the action without exposure to full in personam liability 
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fer quasi in rem jurisdiction was easier to obtain because it did 
not require the minimum contacts, fair play and substantial jus- 
tice due process standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washing- 
ton9 necessary for in personam jurisdiction. Shaffer held that 
any assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction must conform to the 
International Shoe standard.1° While t.his holding may not have 
been unexpected," with it "a whole citadel of precedent and tra- 
dition had fallen."'* No longer could state jurisdiction be exer- 
cised simply because a defendant's property is located within 
the state. 
Although the old "presence of property" theory for quasi in 
rem jurisdiction was rejected, little else could be determined 
with certainty from the Shaffer opinion. In the immediate after- 
math, commentators pondered Shaffer's tea leaves with great in- 
tensity.13 Some argued that Shaffer meant that quasi in rem ju- 
in the event that the plaintiff prevails. In other words, with n limited nppmnnce, the 
defendant can litigate the claim, but exposure is confined to the vnlue of the property. 
Whether or not to grant a limited appearance has varied with state prncticc. Aside from 
an occasional suggestion to the contrary, Simpson v. Laehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,311,234 
N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633,637 (1967), limited oppenrnnces hnve not been con- 
sidered a constitutional prerequisite for the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Silbermnn, 
supra note 3, a t  67 11.185. 
In those jurisdictions that do not recognize a limited nppenrnnce, the defendant 
faces an unpleasant choice. He can default in which case the judgment would be wtistied 
out of the property, but the judgment would not extend beyond thnt even if the clnim 
exceeded its value. Or, the defendant could appear, but if he did his potentinl linbility 
increased beyond the value of the property to the full extent of the proven claim. 
Thus, with or without a limited appearance, a quasi in rem nction, by dehition, 
presents the possibility of multiple litigation on the same clnim, nn exception to the 
otherwise firm rule against it. See, e.g., Allen v. hlcCurry, 449 US. 90, 94 (19801 (The 
doctrine of res judicata preventing relitigation of the same c h i n  serves to "relieve p x -  
ties of the cost and vexation of multiple la~asuits, conserve[s] judicinl resources, and by 
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on ndjudicntion."). For a discus- 
sion of the significance of this facet of quasi in rem jurisdiction, see text ommp3nying 
notes 223-31 infra. 
International Shoe Co. v. Ilrashiigton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a discussion of 
International Shoe, see notes 40-44 and accompanying text infra. 
lo Shuffer, 433 U.S. a t  212. For a discussion of this standnrd, see notes 40,44,235 
and accompanying text infra. 
l1 The demise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, a t  least as i t  hnd been trnditionnlly used, 
had been predicted for some time. Silberman, supra note 3, nt 65. 
l2 Id. a t  34. 
IS The outpouring of scholarly treatment of Shuffer in the first y e m  after its publi- 
cation is truly remarkable. Three publications, the Brooklyn Lorv Review, the Ism Low 
Review, and the Washington University Law Quarterly made Shaffer the subject of sym- 
posia Symposium Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 493 (1979); Symposium: 
State-Court Judicial Jurisdiction After ShaEer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L RE%. 991 (19781; 
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risdiction was effectively dead." Others claimed that quasi in 
rem jurisdiction could continue, but in an altered state.l"til1 
others, relying on the concurring opinions of Justices Powell and 
Stevens,16 saw Shaffer as a very limited holding that would not 
destroy the traditional use of quasi in rem jurisdiction so long as 
the property attached was concrete and physically located in a 
particular state, unlike the rather ephemeral stock certificates 
that were the basis for jurisdiction in Shaffer.17 
The great outpouring of commentary on Shaffer occurred 
before there was time for its effect to be truly assessed in the 
courts.lS However, the past thirteen years have allowed the dust 
Symposium: The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. UL.Q. 273. A partial listing 
of the Articles that appeared in the first three years after Shaffer include the following: 
Casad, Shaffer v. Heitnec An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 61 (1977); Chase, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in Social Context: Some Thoughts 
on a New Statute, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 617 (1979); Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intan- 
gible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102 (1978); Moore, Procedural 
Due Process in Quasi in Rem Actions After Shaffer v. Heitner, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
157 (1978); Olsen, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Survey of its Effects on Washington Jurisdic- 
tion, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 72 (1977); Reese, Shaffer v. Heitner: Implications for the Doctrine 
of Seider v. Roth, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (1978); Riesenfeld, Shder v. Heitner: Holding, 
Implications, Forebodings, 30 HASTXNGS L.J. 1183 (1979); Slomanson, Real Property Un- 
related to Claim: Due Process for Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 83 DICK L. REV. 51 (19781 
79); Smit, The Importance of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal, 46 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 519 (1979); Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Im- 
pact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 997 (1978); Younger, Quasi in Rem Defaults 
After Shaffer v. Heitner: Some Unanswered Questions, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 675 (1979); 
Zammit, Refiections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HAsTXNcs CONST. LQ. 15 (1978); Note, Min- 
imum Contacts and Jurisdictional Theory in New York: The Effect of ShafFer v. Heit- 
ner, 42 ALB. L. REV. 294 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Minimum Contacts and Jurisdictional 
Theory]; Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner's Effect on Pre-Judgment Attachment, Jurisdic- 
tion Based on Property and New York's Seider Doctrine: Have We Finally Given Up 
the Ghost of the Rest, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 323 (1978); Comment, Quasi in Rem on the 
Heels of Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe Fits . . ., 46 FORD HA^^ L. REV. 469 
(1977); Comment, The Assertion of Jurisdiction Based Upon Attachment After Shaffor 
v. Heitner: A Model Statute, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 377 (1980); Comment, State Court 
Jurisdiction After Shaffer v. Heitner: The Lingering Problems, 15 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 
281 (1979). 
There also has been commentary on whether or not Shaffer upset fedord admiralty 
jurisdiction, a debate that remains unresolved. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3. 
Casad, supra note 13, at 78; Farrell, Civil Practice, 1977 Survey of New York 
Law, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 449,450-61 (1978). 
" Chase, supra note 13, at 627-32; Silberman, supra note 3, at 71-76; Note, Mini- 
mum Contacts and Jurisdictional Theory, supra note 13, at 305-07. 
Ie Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring); id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
l7 See, e.g., Smit, supra note 13, at 523-24. 
l8 While Shaffer was primarily directed to assertions of state court jurisdiction, fod- 
eral courts also play a role in this area since often these issues arise in diversity jurisdic- 
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from Shaffer to settle. Therefore, this is a good time to take a 
fresh look at  quasi in rem jurisdiction to assess the real impact 
of Shaffer and to determine whether its continued use makes 
sense. This Article contains the first national survey of the post- 
Shaffer use of quasi in rem jurisdiction.le The survey reveals 
that a new theory for the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction is de- 
vel0ping.2~ New York courts, followed so far by a small number 
of other states, have used this new theory to justify the contin- 
ued use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in a wide variety of large 
commercial and tort cases.21 The new approach stands in sharp 
contrast to that of the majority of states where quasi in rem ju- 
risdiction is no longer in use, notwithstanding enabling legisla- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  A danger inherent in the emerging minority doctrine is 
that it will be accepted uncritically in states that have neither 
repealed the enabling legislation, nor afiirmatively rejected it by 
appellate decision. 
This Article closely examines the rationale offered for the 
new quasi in rem jurisdiction, and concludes that it cannot with- 
stand careful analy~is.2~ Courts have explained that the new the- 
ory of quasi in rem jurisdiction is necessary to fill gaps in the 
state's long arm statute. However, gaps in a long arm sGtute can 
be filled by legislative amendments which can provide in per- 
sonam jurisdiction up to the full extent permitted by due pro- 
cess. In fact, long arm statutes have steadily expanded over the 
last decade to take up the slack left by Shaffer. In personam 
tion cases using state law. See notes 146-47 and accompanying text infra. 
Even though information as to the real impact of Shaffer on state jurisdictional 
practices has been available for several years, i t  has not been reported or nnnlJ-zed. If 
nothing else, the great deluge of Shaffer Articles immediately nfter the w e  n.as decided. 
but not since, proves that legal scholarship, like any other human endenvor, "is rapon- 
sive to fashions." Crampton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. LJ. 1. 14 (1936). 
For civil procedure buffs in the period from 1978 to 1980 the "current fad" wp Sh"cfTer. 
S i c e  then the fad has moved elsewhere. See, e.g., R. h h c u s ,  hf. REDl~ili & E S~imum, 
C m  PROCEDURE A MODERN APPROACH 96 (1989) (''[an the lnst decode them has been 
much enthusiasm for findiig alternatives to in-court resolution of disputes. [Tjhe litera- 
ture on ADR has mushroomed to substantial proportions, and there are several legal 
periodicials devoted entirely to this subject"); Resnick, hianagerial Judges, 96 HARK L 
REV. 374 (1982) (critically evaluating the trend away from the traditional role of judicinl 
decision making by using judges to aggressively manage and control doeketsl. 
20 See text accompanying notes 134-74 infra. 
See notes 134-57 and accompanying text infra. 
See notes 104-32 and accompanying text infra. 
2s See notes 198-274 and accompanying text infra. 
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jurisdiction under a long arm statute is far preferable to the new 
quasi in rern jurisdiction. Indeed, given its reliance on attach- 
ment, its limited res judicata effect, and its vague and uncertain 
the new quasi in rern jurisdiction may very well be 
unconstitutional and is surely bad policy. Moreover, the manner 
in which the new quasi in rern jurisdiction has been unilaterally 
forged by courts violates separation of powers.a5 This Article ar- 
gues, therefore, that state courts should not succumb to the 
temptation to embrace the new quasi in rern jurisdiction, and 
that it should be repudiated in New York and the other states 
that follow it. 
. This Article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the 
development of quasi in rern jurisdiction, and examines the Su- 
preme Court's decision in Shaffer. Part I1 surveys the use of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction in the states since Shaffer. It traces 
and analyzes the growth of the new quasi in rern jurisdiction 
doctrine, considers the causes of this development, and contrasts 
the new doctrine with the developments in the large majority of 
states that have not used quasi in rern jurisdiction since Shaffer. 
Part I11 considers the contemporary validity of quasi in rern ju- 
risdiction, and demonstrates that it is no longer a valid jurisdic- 
tional device. The Article concludes that the new quasi in rern 
jurisdiction threatens to resuscitate a doctrine that, after honor- 
able service, deserves retirement. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUASI N REM JURISDICTION AND Shaffer 
v. Heitner 
Quasi in rern jurisdiction in America is often traced to the 
Supreme Court's 1877 opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff,ac but its 
'' See notes 198-239 and accompanying text infra. 
26 See text accompanying notes 240-74 infra. 
28 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878), is "often credited as being the basis of 
our conceptual framework of.  . . quasi in rern jurisdiction." Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem JU- 
risdiction: Outmoded and ~nconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 668, 688 (1975). Its 
real significance, however, lies in the fact that Pennoyer raised the tripartite distinctions 
between in rem, quasi in rern and in personam jurisdiction to "a level of constitutional 
significance which they neither previously enjoyed nor, perhaps, deserved!' Id. 
Pennoyer itself dealt with an in personam claim that arose while the decedent was a 
resident of the forum state. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at  715-16. However, in the Supreme Court 
quasi in rern jurisdiction was relied upon since the defendant, who was no longer a resi- 
dent of the state when the action was brought, owned property in the state. The diffr- 
culty with the assertion of quasi in rern jurisdiction was twofold: first, a t  tho time tho 
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roots can be found in far earlier times. To understand what has 
happened with quasi in rem jurisdiction in the decade since 
Shaffer, it is important first to know why it developed, how i t  
was used, and what its practical and doctrinal underpinnings 
were. It is also important to review criticisms of the doctrine 
that emerged in the period prior to Shaffer, as well as the facts 
and holding of the Shaffer opinion itself. This section briefly 
considers these questions. 
A. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in America 
1. The Practical and Doctrinal Need 
Quasi in rem jurisdiction was well established in Great Brit- 
ain when the first English settlers arrived in A~nerica.~' During 
the first decade of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, however, it 
was not used. Colonists who financed their beginnings in the 
action was commenced the defendant did not own the property, Perdue, Sin, Scandal, 
and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsider*.' 62 
WMH. L REV. 479,485 n.45 (1987), and second, the property was never attached. Pen- 
Izoyer, 95 U.S. a t  728. Thus, the Court's endorsement of quasi in rem jurisdiction was, to 
some extent, backhanded since the Court disapproved the manner of its w e  in the caw 
before it. 
" At common law, quasi in rem jurisdiction was not used in quite the m e  way as i t  
developed in America. Jurisdiction in England required both service of p roms  on the 
defendant within the confines of the jurisdiction, and an a c t d  appeamnca by the de- 
fendant. Default judgments were not recognized until 1725, and then only tentatively. It 
was not until 1845 that default judgments were "unqualifiedly" permitted in the modern 
manner. Levy, Mesne Process in Personal Actions a t  Common Law and the Power Doc 
trine, 78 YALE U. 52, 79, 92 (1968) [hereinafter Levy, hiesne Procm]. Attachment, 
therefore, in the early common law was used primarily to compel a defendnnt to appeor. 
If he did not, the property reverted to the Crown. Id. a t  60. 
A closer corollary to the American use of quasi in rem jurisdiction was the prnctica 
of attachment that developed in the Lord hlayor's Court in London in the Mteenth cen- 
tury. There, beginning as early as 1419, attachment v2as used to obtain jurisdiction over u 
debtor who incurred the debt within the jurisdiction, but who did not respond to at- 
tempts a t  personal service of process. Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment 
Execution: Some American Problems Considered in the Light of the English Experi- 
ence, 5 COW. L REV. 399,406-10 (1972-73) [hereinafter Levy, Attachment]. See also R 
supra note 4, a t  482. 
Although close in form to the quasi in rem jurisdiction that developed in the United 
States, the London practice varied in that the London device did not gmttt extm temto- 
rial jurisdiction - it was limited to claim that arose within the boundaries of the City of 
London. Id. a t  481 n.1. In addition, i t  was a substitute for in personnm juridiction. That 
is to say, it could only be obtained when in personam jurisdiction was not passible ba- 
cause the defendant could not be located for service of process. Id. Curiously, therefore, 
Shaffer, which moves quasi in rem jurisdiction closer to in personnm jurisdiction, is more 
true to the spirit of the common law history than was Pennoyer. 
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new world through credit were considered good risks. This was 
primarily because of the relative prosperity of the times. Addi- 
tionally, the colonial community was homogeneous, and the col- 
onists assumed that those few settlers who fell behind in their 
payments would respond voluntarily to proceedings brought by 
their ~ red i to r s .~~  
These halcyon days quickly ended, however, as rapid 
changes swept the colonies. Within the first decade of settle- 
ment, population grew in size and diversity, the frontier was 
pushed further into the interior, and the first economic depres- 
sion hit.29 Because credit had been abundant, this depression 
had a devastating impact. Scores of pioneer debtors defected to 
new settlements in the vast wilderness, leaving their property 
behind. Poor transportation and communication among the colo- 
nies made it virtually impossible to find the fleeing debtors.80 
When creditors began calling in the debts, the debtors did not 
respond. Since there was no way to compel a debtor's appear- 
ance, creditors needed a remedy. Quasi in rem jurisdiction, 
which was part of the English legal tradition from which the col- 
onists had come, fit the bill.31 Quasi in rem jurisdiction gave 
creditors a forum for the adjudication of their claims, and a 
means to obtain at least partial satisfaction of their judgments. 
Thus, in 1641, the first American quasi in rem jurisdiction law 
28 During the first decade of the settlement of the Massachusetts Bay Colony there 
were only a thousand settlers. The Colony was made up of a series of "small self-con- 
tained agricultural agricultural communities whose inhabitants were united in purpose 
by a mixture of religious and political philosophy and by the common need to survive in 
a new and hostile environment." Kalo, Jurisdiction as a n  Evolutionary Process: The 
Development of Quasi in Rem and I n  Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1160. 
In this close knit setting with people bound together "by a strong sense of community, 
common religious beliefs and the mutual need to survive" a summons "was d l  that was 
reasonably required to make the system work adequately." Id. at  1153. 
20 Id. a t  1155. The depression was made worse for creditors by the fifteen fold in- 
crease in population in one decade bringing in people "with differing attitudes and bo- 
liefs." Id. at  1156. As a result, the "economic and social cohesiveness" of the earlier time 
was gone. This increased the risk of default. Id. 
In early colonial America, communication flowed directly from each colony to tho 
mother country. Because the transportation network was undeveloped, there was little 
inter-colonial intercourse. Id. "Overland transportation was not only difficult, expensive 
and time consuming, but also dangerous." Sea travel was "unpredictable." Id. a t  1166-67. 
See note 27 supra. I t  is no mystery why the colonists borrowed from English law. 
They had, of course, come from there, and equally as important "[olnly England had a 
supply of law that American lawyers could use without translation." L. FRIEDMAN, A HIS- 
TORY OF AMERICAN LAW 34 (2d ed. 1985). 
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was passed.32 The practical need for quasi in rern jurisdiction 
continued well into the nineteenth century. As long as huge sec- 
tions of the continent were underdeveloped, and transportation 
and communication among its far flung parts remained prirni- 
tive, quasi in rern jurisdiction provided an important and practi- 
cal procedural recourse for creditors who otherwise would have 
been unable to find a forum for their claims. These conditions 
were so common that every state passed a law providing for 
quasi in rern jurisdi~tion.~~ 
In its heyday, there was another reason why quasi in rern 
jurisdiction was so appealing. Until the middle of the fmentieth 
century, jurisdiction over defendants in state court actions was 
rigidly controlled by the "power" doctrine enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer u. Neff.=' Under that 
doctrine, a state lacked authority to enter an in personam judg- 
ment against a defendant who was not present in the jurisdic- 
tion at the time of service, unless the defendant was a citizen of 
the state, or had consented to suit?5 The Pennoyer doctrine se- 
a Kalo, supra note 28, a t  1158-59. The Colony a t  first tried the old dommon lnw 
system of attachment to compel the defendant's appearance, but i t  was not suited to the 
conditions then prevailing. Id. a t  1160. 
It is hardly surprising that attachment jurisdiction of the London variety c;ns devel- 
oped in these conditions. As Professor Levy has opined: 
In every society in which credit transactions have existed - and thnt include3 
virtually every civilized society - creditors have been troubled by the depnr- 
ture for parts unknown of persons to whom they hnve made l o r n  or to whom 
they have sold goods on credit. . . . Thus, i t  is only natural that such societies 
should develop the means whereby local creditors can reach with dipatch any 
assets their departed debtors may have left behind. Such was the case of the 
early Law Merchant, and such was the case in London , . . . 
Levy, Attachment, supra note 27, a t  405. 
SS R. MELAR, supra note 4, a t  486; Kalo, supra note 28, nt 1161; Silbermnn, supra 
note 3, a t  43. Indeed, quasi in rern jurisdiction became so established in the United 
States that one observer could report that "attachments became pnrt of the g e n e d  pat- 
tern of business practices." R ~ ~ L A R ,  supra note 4, a t  486 (quoting R ~ ~ O P Z W  LTRO- 
DUCTION TO SELECT CASES OF THE ~ ~ A Y O R ' S  COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, 1674-1780 19-20 
(1915)). 
Although quasi in rern jurisdiction was universally avnilnble, there were vuintions in 
the states. Some states, for example, did not allow attachment ngainst nonraidents in 
tort cases; others required that the defendant be a nonresident in nll situntiom in which 
it could be used. For a discussion of the variations in usage of quasi in rern jurisdiction, 
see R MILLAR, supra note 4, a t  486-97. 
=' Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
" Justice Field derived the power theory of jurisdiction which so long ruled jurisdic- 
tional theory in the United States from Justice Story's famous Commentaries on the 
Conflict of Law. Siberman, supra note 3, a t  45. It, in turn, rvas borrowed from continen- 
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verely restricted the jurisdiction of state courts to hear claims by 
citizens aggrieved by the actions of nonresidents, even if the ac- 
tivities that gave rise to suit took place in the state, and even if 
the defendant could be found elsewhere and served. However, at 
the same time that it announced constitutional limitations on 
the use of in personam jurisdiction, the Pennoyer Court permit- 
ted the open-ended use of quasi in rem jurisdiction. If the non- 
resident defendant's property in the state was attached at the 
commencement of the action, Pennoyer held that quasi in rem 
jurisdiction was proper, even if in personam jurisdiction was not. 
This use of quasi in rem jurisdiction spared many plaintiffs the 
burden of a difficult and costly, if not impossible, trip to com- 
mence the action in the nonresident's state. Thus, quasi in rem 
jurisdiction played an important doctrinal role. By loosening the 
artificial straightjacket of the Pennoyer doctrine, quasi in rem 
jurisdiction provided at least a "partial escape from the stric- 
tures of the territorial theory of [in personam] jurisdi~tion."~~ 
Pennoyer's restriction on in personam jurisdiction was 
clearly out of step with the changing times.37 Rapidly improving 
transportation and communications systems of the late nine- 
teenth and twentieth centuries cast serious doubt on the wisdom 
of the decision. These changes meant that it was becoming more 
difficult for defendants to escape service of process. At  the same 
time, improvements in transportation made it less burdensome 
for defendants to respond to litigation brought against them in 
another jurisdiction. Pennoyer perhaps worked the greatest un- 
fairness in cases involving multi-state, corporate defendants 
which conducted business on a national scale, but were able to 
use the Pennoyer doctrine to avoid In the 1945 case of 
tal theories designed to regulate relationships between sovereign states in Europo. Zam- 
mit, supra note 26, a t  669. The basic idea was expressed by Justice Field in two maxims. 
First, "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and 
property within its territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. a t  722. Second, "no tribunal established 
by [a state] can extend its process beyond that territory." Id. For a comploto description 
of the doctrine and its conceptual underpinnings, see Hazard, A General Tlteory of 
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241. For a fascinating history of this somi- 
nal case, see Perdue, supra note 26, at  479-90. 
SB Zammit, supra note 26, at  670. 
37 See, e.g., J. LANDERS, J. MARTIN & S. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 73 (2d od. 1988) 
("Pennoyer [was attacked because it] had its feet planted in a preindustrial world!'). 
38 See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and thc In  
Personam Jurisdiction of the State Courts - From Pennoyer to Denckla, 25 U. CHI. L. 
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International Shoe Co. u. Washington,SB the Supreme Court 
sought to bring jurisdictional theory more in line with the times. 
The resulting opinion ultimately served as the basis for a chal- 
lenge to  quasi in rem jurisdiction itself. 
2. International Shoe Co. u. Washington and the Trans- 
formation of American Jurisdictional Law 
In International Shoe, the Court held that physical pres- 
ence of the defendant was no longer required for the assertion of 
in personam jurisdiction. Rather, due process is satisfied so long 
as the nonresident had "minimum contacts with [the forum 
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "'O In- 
ternational Shoe had a profound effect on jurisdictional law. 
The most immediate effect was that it unleashed a movement to 
expand in personam jurisdiction well beyond that which was 
possible under the Pennoyer doctrine. By the early 1960s this 
movement culminated in every state having a long arm statute." 
REV. 569, 577-86 (1958). 
326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
'O Id. a t  316 (quoting hlilliken v. hfeyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)). In o subequent 
opinion, the Court made clear that the expansion of notions of in peroennm jurisdiction 
was a consequence of the "increasing nationalization of commerce" and of "modern 
transportation and communications systems [that] have mode i t  much less burdensome 
for a party sued to defend h i e l f  in a State where he engages in economic nctivit~*." 
McGee v. International L i e  Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
However, replacing the simple-to-apply presence test of Pennoyer with the more 
free floating minimum contacts due process standard of International Shoe also hnd the 
effect of launching the Court and commentators on a journey into the mpteries of per- 
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants from which no one h n ~  yet returned. I t  
was much easier for the Court to reject the rigid applicntion of the Pennoyer doctrine 
than i t  has been to find a comprehensible replacement theory. The Court h struggled 
mightily with the problem and has returned to the issue continunlly in recent years. See, 
e.g., Asahi hletal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewia, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler hfagazine, Inc, 465 US. 770 
(1984);Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxities de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 
(1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. ivoodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). "Yet despite 
this growing body of case law, the doctrinal underpinnings remnin elusive." Perdue, 
supra note 26, a t  479. For a comprehensive treatment of the theoretical debate un- 
leashed by the minimum contacts test of International Shoe, see, cg, Brilmyer, HOW 
Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT- 
REV. 77; Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Developments in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARK 
L. REV. 909 (1960). 
For discussions of this significant development, see Currie, The Grolrth of the 
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Although International Shoe had an immediate effect on in 
personam jurisdiction, until Shaffer courts did not view Interna- 
tional Shoe as disturbing the Pennoyer Court's endorsement of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction. Indeed, the International Shoe opin- 
ion did not even mention quasi in rern jurisdiction. One reason 
for this was that International Shoe dealt with a different ques- 
tion. It raised the issue of whether a state could constitutionally 
assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
when the defendant was not present in the state at the time of 
service.42 Put another way, International Shoe dealt with 
whether a use of in personam jurisdiction prohibited by Pen- 
noyer should be permitted. By contrast, quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion shifts the focus to whether forms of jurisdiction permitted 
by Pennoyer, such as quasi in rern jurisdiction, should be pro- 
hibited. Although this is a related question, International Shoe 
did not deal with it directly. Thus, it was possible to interpret 
the International Shoe decision in a way that continued to au- 
thorize quasi in rern jurisdiction without ~hange,'~ which is ex- 
actly what courts did for years after the International Shoe de- 
cision was handed down. Courts continued to make use of quasi 
in rern jurisdiction in the old way without serious question as to 
whether a minimum contacts analysis was req~ired. '~ Although 
courts did not see International Shoe as disturbing the author- 
ity for quasi in rern jurisdiction, commentators did. 
3. The Pre-Shaffer Critique of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction 
The major line of argument by commentators was that the 
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; 
Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15 
BUFFALO L. REV. 61 (1965). For a comprehensive description of the current long arm 
statutes used by the states, see R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1983). 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311-12 (1945). 
Silberman, supra note 3, a t  51. 
Id. a t  35 n.4 (collecting cases). Prior to Shaffer, state courts almost routinely up. 
held quasi in rern jurisdiction "without discussing the applicability" of the minimum 
contacts standard. Id. Only three courts had considered the question, and all three had 
"expressly decided not to apply the International Shoe standard to quasi in rern juris- 
diction." Id. 
Prior to 1963 when Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amendod 
to permit the use of attachment actions in federal courts, a quasi in rem jurisdiction 
action could not be brought originally in these courts even in a diversity action. C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 424-25 (4th ed. 1983). 
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unbridled use of quasi in rern jurisdiction allowed plaintiffs to 
secure jurisdiction over nonresident defendants even when it 
was unfair.46 As Dean Carrington noted: "In the light of the 
emerging concept of personal jurisdiction, the quasi in rern pro- 
cedure is rarely useful to plaintiffs except in cases which the de- 
fendant ought not to be asked to defend in the forum chosen by . 
the This argument was fortified by the extremes to 
which courts had pushed quasi in rern jurisdiction." For exam- 
ple, in Harris v. the Supreme Court upheld the use of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction over a nonresident whose only contact 
with the state was a visit there by his debtor. There was no indi- 
cation that litigation in the defendant's home state would have 
been onerous, or that the presence of such intangible property as 
the defendant's debtor in the forum state was anything more 
than happenstan~e.'~ Some courts had taken the Harris doctrine 
even further in the 1960s, when they held quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion could be used to permit a plaintiff to at9ch a nonresident's 
insurance policy to litigate a personal injury action even though 
the claim arose outside the state, and the defendant had no con- 
tacts with the forum state other than ownership of the policy.60 
The major critics were: Carrington, The hfodern Utility of Quasi I n  Rent Juris- 
diction, 76 HARV. L REV. 303 (1962); Von hlehren 6: Trautmnn, supra noto 40; Znmmit, 
supra note 26; Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamen- 
tal Test of Fairness, 69 MXCH. L REV. 300 (1970); Note, Jurisdiction in New York: A 
Proposed Reform, 69 C o ~ u a t  L REV. 1412 (1969). Supporters were few m d  far between. 
For one see Smit, The Enduring Utility of I n  Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer 
v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600 (1977). 
46 Carrington, supra note 45, a t  306. Professor Carrington for this reason called 
quasi in rern jurisdiction an "antique device." Id. a t  303. In the words of mother com- 
mentator, quasi in rern jurisdiction was a "jurisdictional mjztique." Comment, supra 
note 45, a t  325. Still another referred to quasi in rern jurisdiction ns a "vestigial con- 
cept" Note, supra note 45, a t  1422. 
47 See notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra. 
" 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
48 In Harris, both Harris and Balk were residents of North Carolina Hnrris owed 
Balk $180. Balk was indebted to Jawb Epstein, a hfnryland resident, for 2300. \ W e  
Harris was temporarily visiting hlaryland, Epstein brought a quasi in rem jurisdiction 
action against Balk by obtaining a writ of attachment agoinst Harris. Id. a t  216. His 
theory was that Harris physically carried hi indebtedness to Bnlk wherever he troveled. 
Id. a t  218. Harris, after he paid his debt to Balk over to Epstein, clnimed thnt he hod 
satisfied his debt, and it was this rather extreme contention thnt wns upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court. Id. a t  222. For an intriguing history of this sogn of "the 
power theory [at] its zenith," see Silberman, supra note 3, at 49; Lowenfeld, supra note 
13, a t  104-07. 
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312,269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). In Seider, 
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The critique of these cases was heated. Critics complained 
that the property that formed the predicate for quasi in rem ju- 
risdiction had no relationship to the dispute. First, they argued 
that the property attached, a debt in Harris for example, was 
intangible; and only in the most metaphysical sense could it be 
said that this property had been brought into the state inten- 
t i o n & ~ . ~ ~  Second, even if one could surmount that problem, 
there was still the difficulty of attributing the debtor's intention 
to the creditor over whom jurisdiction is sought.6a 
Critics also contended that the unfairness was compounded 
by ex parte attachment used to obtain quasi in rem jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Attachment gave plaintiffs an added procedural weapon 
by tying up the defendant's property while litigation was pend- 
ing.64 This criticism took on added significance with the Su- 
preme Court's 1972 opinion in Fuentes u. S h e ~ i n . ~ ~  In Fuentes, 
the Court held that pre-judgment seizure of the personal prop- 
erty of a debtor in a replevin action must be accompanied by 
procedural due process protections. Although the Fuentes Court 
did not deal with the use of attachment for jurisdictional pur- 
p o s e ~ , ~ ~  its holding, and that of its progeny, cast doubt on 
whether the ex parte attachment procedure for quasi in rem ju- 
the plaintiffs, who were New York residents, sued a Quebec defendant in Now York state 
court for injuries arising out of an automobile accident in Vermont. Although there was 
no basis on these facts for in personam jurisdiction, the plaintiff sought to obtain quasi 
in rem jurisdiction by attaching the defendant's auto insurance policy, which was with a 
company that was located in New York. The New York Court of Appeals upheld tho 
attachment on the ground that the insurance company's obligation to the defendant was 
a debt that could form the basis for jurisdiction. The court's ruling that the situs of a 
debt is the physical location of the debtor followed logically from Harris U. Balk, but tho 
extreme result that i t  yielded in that case was harshly criticized by commentators. See, 
e.g., Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction ouer Non-Residents - New York 
Goes Wild, 35 INS. Cou~s .  L.J. 118 (1968); Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many 
or Putting Seider Back Into I ts  Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1971); Comment, supra 
note 45, a t  325-38; Note, supra note 45, a t  1422-25. 
O' The criticisms of Seider were particularly extensive and severe. See generally 
Reese, supra note 13; Rosenberg, supra note 50. 
OZ Indeed, with the birth of the Seider doctrine in 1966, some state courts took tho 
doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction to new heights notwithstanding International Shoe. 
OS Attachment has long been assumed to be a sina qua non of quasi in ram jurisdic- 
tion. See note 198 and accompanying text infra. Prior to Fuentes, i t  was almost always 
granted ex parte. Fuentes changed that. See notes 131-32, 200 and accompanying text 
infra. 
Zammit, supra note 26, a t  679. 
407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
O-ee note 206 and accompanying text infra. 
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risdiction could ~ontinue.~' Finally, critics pointed out that the 
use of quasi in 1.m jurisdiction was "at odds with the modern 
concept of res j~d ica ta . "~~  Whenever the device was used to lay 
claim to property of less value than the plaintms total damages, 
there was an ever present possibility of repeated litigation in 
several jurisdictions over the same claim.6B 
To be sure, there were defenders of quasi in rem jurisdic- 
tion. They pointed out that quasi in rem jurisdiction could aid 
the judgment creditor who was seeking to enforce an out-of-state 
judgment against a recalcitrant defendant who has property in 
the enforcing state.60 They also argued that it provided security 
for a plaintiff suing a defendant who might secrete or dissipate 
assets.s1 Finally, proponents of quasi in rem jurisdiction con- 
trasted International Shoe's vague "minimum contacts," "fair 
play," and "substantial justice" standards with the much clearer 
standard. needed for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Under the old 
standards, quasi in rem jurisdiction was prpper so long as the 
property was present in the state.s2 This clear standard, propo- 
nents argued, avoided wasteful preliminary litigation on jurisdic- 
tional issues.ss In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court finally con- 
fronted some of the arguments for and against quasi in rem 
jurisdiction, and in the process shook the foundations on which 
For a more complete discussion of the Fuentes line of cases, see notes 206-22 and 
accompanying text infra. 
s8 Carrington, supra note 45, a t  314. 
nB See notes 224-31 and accompanying text infra. 
" The foremost advocate of this point of view was the American Lor? Institute. See 
RE~~ATEMENT (SECOND) OP CONFLICT OF LAWS $66  comment a (1971) (quoted in ShalJer, 
433 U.S. a t  210). 
Protecting a plaintiff against the demonstrated possibility that the defendnnt by 
stealth will depreciate the plaintiffs abiity to realistically recover the judgment, is one 
of the original purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction. See notes 27-32 and ocmmpmying 
text supra. But as a justification for the broad use of quasi in rem jurisdiction bawd 
simply on the presence of the defendant's property i t  sweeps too broadly. One commen- 
tator, seeing the "possible injustice" of this justification for qunsi in rem jurisdiction, 
wrote: "The difficulty with such a rationale is that the defendant moy not bo attempting 
to evade his creditors by owning property in another state. Unless proof of such conduct 
is required, the rationale actually means that evasion is presumed in order to assert ju- 
risdiction." Developments in the Law, supra note 40, a t  955; see also Carrington, supra 
note 45, a t  307-08. 
See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra. 
" Carrington, supra note 45, a t  309. See also Smit, supra note 45, o t  612 ("[Tjhe 
essential inquiry necessary to determine whether there is judicial [quosi in rem] jurisdic- 
tion is relatively simple."). 
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the doctrine had stood for centuries. 
B. ShafTer v. Heitner 
Shaffer v. Heitner was a shareholders' derivative action 
filed in Delaware state court by Arnold Heitner, the owner of 
one share of the Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware corpora- 
tion. Heitner alleged that mismanagement of the corporation by 
its officers led to two legal proceedings, a civil antitrust action, 
and a criminal contempt proceeding, which cost the company 
over thirteen and one half million dollars in fines and damages.04 
Heitner brought suit in Delaware even though the corporation's 
headquarters were in Arizona, the activities of the directors oc- 
curred in Oregon, and none of the defendant directors resided or 
did business in Delaware. 
The action was brought under a Delaware sequestration 
statute that allowed a plaintiff to obtain quasi in rem jurisdic- 
tion over a defendant without prior notice by obtaining a court 
order to attach the defendant's property. Plaintiff was able to 
obtain the order because Delaware law mandated that the state 
of Delaware would be deemed the situs of all of the stock of 
Delaware corporations, even if the stock certificates were not 
physically located in the state.65 The defendants moved to dis- 
miss the action, arguing that the sequestration law violated pro- 
cedural due process, and that under International Shoe the 
state court lacked jurisdiction because there were no minimum 
contacts between defendants and Delaware. However, the Dela- 
ware courts upheld jurisdiction, focusing on the procedural due 
process issue.e6 
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the five member 
majority:' Justice Marshall dealt only with the defendants' con- 
e' Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t  189-90. One action was an anti-trust proceeding in Oregon in 
which a judgment of $13,146,090 plus attorney fees was assessed; the other was a crimi- 
nal contempt proceeding in Illinois that led to a fine of $100,000 to Greyhound and 
$500,000 to Greyhound Lines. Id. a t  190 nn.2-3. 
Id. a t  192. Apparently, Delaware is the only state with such a statute. Note, Mini- 
mum Contacts and Jurisdictional Theory, supra note 13, a t  297 n.30 (citing Appollant's 
Brief on the Merits, a t  27 n.14). 
Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t  193-95. The state court dealt with defendant's basis argu- 
ment in just two paragraphs. The court relied on the long history of quasi in rem juris- 
diction to render the argument not "significant." Greyhound Corp. v. Heitnor, 361 A.2d 
225, 229 (Del. 1976). 
B' Justice Marshall's opinion was joined in by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices 
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tention that the plaintws use of quasi in rern jurisdiction could 
not be reconciled with the fairness standard of International 
Shoe.6s The Court acknowledged that although International 
Shoe had dramatically changed the law regarding in personam 
jurisdiction, "[nlo equally dramatic change has occurred in the 
law governing jurisdiction in rem."6Q Undertaking a long post- 
poned examination of quasi in rern jurisdiction, the Court con- 
cluded that it is "an ancient form without substantial modern 
justificati~n."~~ Since jurisdiction over a thing is no different 
than "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing,'*l the 
standard of International Shoe must be used to determine 
whether jurisdiction is appropriate regardless of the type of ju- 
risdiction in~oked.?~ 
The Shaffer Court also addressed the arguments of those 
who supported the old method of quasi in rern jurisdiction. In 
response to the argument that the old standard is necessary to 
allow for enforcement of judgments, Justice" Marshall stated: 
[W]e know of nothing to justify the assumption that a debtor can 
avoid paying his obligations by removing his property to a State in 
which his creditor cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him. The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the valid in personam 
judgment of one state enforceable in all other states.7J 
Addressing the argument that the old quasi in rern jurisdiction 
was necessary to prevent a defendant from removing assets from 
the state, Marshall responded that subjecting quasi in rern juris- 
diction to a minimum contacts analysis did not mean that a 
state would be deprived of authority to attach property "as se- 
curity for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litiga- 
Blackmun, Stewart, and White. Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t  188. Justices Powell nnd Stevens 
filed concurring opinions, id. at  217 (Powell, J., concurring); id. (Stevens, J., concurring], 
and Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part, Id. nt 219 (Brennnn, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the 
decision. Id. at  217. Thus, it took four opinions for the eight justices who participated to 
explain the result. 
" The Court specifically reserved the procedural due process kue. Id. nt 189. 
6e Id. at  205. 
Id. at 212. 
Id. at 207. 
7x  The Court noted that the lines separating quasi in rern jurisdiction, in per6onnm 
jurisdiction, and in rern jurisdiction were not always clear. Id. at  201. 
7s Id. at 210. 
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tion can be maintained consistently with International Shoe."74 
The Court was also unpersuaded that history confirmed the con- 
stitutionality of quasi in rem juri~diction.7~ Finally, Justice Mar- 
shall disposed of the argument that whatever its sins, quasi in 
rem jurisdiction had the benefit of being governed by clear 
standards: 
[Tlhe fairness standard of International Shoe can be easily applied in 
the vast majority of cases. Moreover, when the existence of jurisdic- 
tion in a particular forum under International Shoe is unclear, the 
cost of simplifying the litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional ques- 
tion may be the sacrifice of "fair play and substantial justice." That 
cost is too high.76 
The Court indicated that evaluating all forms of jurisdiction ac- 
cording to minimum contacts analysis would not change the re- 
sult of many ca~es.7~ It is primarily when quasi in rem jurisdic- 
tion was used in situations like Harris o. Balk that the Court 
thought "significant" changes would 0ccur.7~ The Shaffer Court 
acknowledged that the presence of the defendant's property in a 
particular state might suggest "other ties among the defendant, 
the state and the l i t igati~n."~~ However, the Court ruled that 
when "the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unre- 
lated to the plaintiffs cause of action,"s0 the mere presence of 
the defendant's property within a particular state would not be 
7' Id. 
76 To this argument the Court replied that constitutional rights "can be as readily 
offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by tho 
adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitu- 
tional heritage." Id. a t  212. 
lB Id. at  211. 
77 In rem jurisdiction, for example, in which the plaintiff seeks to establish his titlo 
to property located within the state as against the entire world, would still be permissi- 
ble, since almost by definition in such cases the requisite minimum contacts would be 
present. Id. at  207-08. This is so because in an in rem proceeding the state has a woighty 
interest in ensuring the marketability of title and in providing a procedure for "peacoful 
resolution of disputes about the possession of that property." Id. a t  208. In addition, tho 
defendant's claim to the property reveals that he expects to benefit from the state's pro- 
tection of his interest which provides the required purposeful availment that is necessary 
for minimum contacts to be present. Id. a t  207-08. Moreover, in quasi in rom cases of tho 
first type the same result would almost invariably be reached since the proceeding would 
involve a disputed claim to property, and both claimants by definition would have estab- 
lished voluntary contacts with the forum state. Id. a t  208. 
Id. 
78 Id. a t  209. 
Id. 
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enough, by itself, to support jurisdi~tion.~' In such cases, the de- 
fendants' property is being used to coerce defendantsy presence 
in the state, and such an "indirect assertion" of jurisdiction vio- 
lates due process "if a direct assertion of jurisdiction over the 
defendant would violate the C~nstitution."~~ Because it did not 
find minimum contacts in the case before it, the Shaffer Court 
reversed the decision of the Delaware Superior 
Justices Powell and Stevens wrote separate concurrences 
quali ing the majority's more sweeping view of the effect of ap- 
plying minimum contacts analysis to quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
Both justices concluded that simple ownership of tangible prop- 
erty was sufficient to constitutionally confer jurisdiction, al- 
though each reached that result by a different r ~ u t e . ~  Justice 
Brennan, concurring in part, and dissenting in part, added a 
fourth opinion to the cacoph~ny.~~ 
Id. 
82 Id. The significance of this statement is not readily apparent since there is no 
provision in Delaware law for a limited appearance. Id. a t  195 n.12. 
BS The Court held that the facts in the case were not sufficient to justify jurisdiction 
under the constitutional standard of Intermtioml Shoe since the property attached ria 
not the subject matter of the litigation, and the claim did not relate to the property or 
arise out of it. Id. a t  213. The Court further relied on the fact thnt the defendants hnd 
never set foot in Delaware, nor could they reasonably have been aware thnt by accepting 
the position of director of the corporation that they mere subjecting themselves to the 
jurisdiction of that state's courts. Id. a t  213-16. 
Justice Powell stressed the importance of avoiding the "uncertainty s f  the general 
International Shoe standard" that mould result from subjecting rill dnims for quasi in 
rem jurisdiction to an open-ended minimum contacts analysis. Id. at 217 (Po~ell ,  J., 
concurring). He indicated that i t  might be appropriate to bnse qunsi in rem jurisdiction 
on the simple "ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably nnd 
permanently located within a state . . . without more." Id. 
Justice Stevens reached the same result via a d i e r e n t  route. Relying upon Justice 
Black's opinion in International Shoe, International Shoe v. \Yashington, 326 Us$. 310, 
324 (1945) (opinion of Black, J.). he posited that the essential purpose of the minimum 
contacts test is to give "fair warning that a particular activity mny subject o person to 
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t  218 (Stevens, J., concurringl. 
While ownership of intangible property such as shares of stock in a corporation v ~ a s  not 
sufficient to provide such notice, ownership of more tangible property. w h ~ z e  situs could 
be easily located, is: "If I visit another State or acquire r e d  estate or open a bank ac- 
count in it, I knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over my 
property or my person while there. hfy contact with the State, though minimal, gives rise 
to predictable risks." Id. 
Id. a t  219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bren- 
nan's opinion applauded the majority's substitution of minimum contacts mdj-sis for 
the old presence test as "a far more sensible construct for the exerch of state-court 
jurisdiction than the patchwork of legal and factual fictions thnt hove been generated 
from the decision in Pennoyer u. Neff." Id. But Justice Brennnn wns willing on tho fncb 
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C. Whither Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction After Shaffer? 
Shaffer confirmed the demise of the old rationales for quasi 
in rern jurisdiction, and raised important questions about its fu- 
ture. Historically, quasi in rern jurisdiction had rested on two 
pillars - one practical and the other theoretical - both of 
which had crumbled by the time of Shaffer. In a developing 
country settled on the edge of a vast wilderness, possessing a 
limited transportation network, and poor means of establishing 
contact with persons who did not reside in the local community, 
quasi in rern jurisdiction served the important practical purpose 
of allowing creditors to obtain some redress for their losses.80 
Without it, plaintiffs would often have been unable to litigate 
claims because they could not locate defendants. Nineteenth 
century jurisdiction doctrine also encouraged the development 
of quasi in rern jurisdiction to counteract the rigors of Pennoyer 
U. Neff.s7 
By the time of Shaffer, both supports had eroded. No 
longer did transportation and communication seriously limit 
plaintiffs' ability to seek out and serve nonresident defendantsOaa 
Similarly, thirty-two years after International Shoe had "re- 
leased state courts from the territorial power concept of jurisdic- 
tionnse imposed by Pennoyer, and permitted them to assert full 
in personam power over any nonresident who has established 
minimum contacts with the forum, it was difficult to contend 
that quasi in rern jurisdiction played an important doctrinal 
role. By cutting quasi in rern jurisdiction loose from its old 
moorings, Shaffer confirmed that too much had changed since 
Pennoyer to justify continuing to think about quasi in rern juris- 
diction in the same way. At the very least, Shaffer forced a re- 
thinking of the basis for the continued use of the doctrine.D0 
presented to find that the defendants had established minimum contacts with the forum 
state. Id. a t  222-28. 
For a discussion of the historic antecedents of quasi in rem jurisdiction, seo notos 
26-33 and accompanying text supra. 
For a discussion of these limitations, see notes 34-36 and accompanying toxt 
supra. 
See notes 37-40, 44 and accompanying text supra. 
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657 (1969). 
After Shaffer, if quasi in rern jurisdiction is to occupy a legitimate niche in tho 
current legal landscape, i t  is incumbent on its supporters to propose a modern rationale 
for its continued use. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said over eighty years ago: 
I t  is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
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The Shaffer Court's fractured opinion "bristle[d] with per- 
ple~ities,"~' however, and left few clear guideposts for establish- 
ing a new theory for quasi in rem jurisdiction. The opinion itself 
led some to wonder whether quasi in rem jurisdiction was still 
constituti~nal.~~ The Shaffer Court clearly had not mandated, in 
so many words, the abolition of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Never- 
theless, it was quite possible to discern a death knell for quasi in 
rem jurisdiction resonating from the tone of the majority opin- 
The demise of quasi in rem jurisdiction was evinced as 
much by what the Court did not say, as by what it did say. For 
example, while the Court addressed the argument that the stan- 
dards traditionally used for application of the doctrine were no 
longer constitutionally justifiable, it did not confront, much less 
answer, other major arguments of the critics of quasi in rem ju- 
risdiction. Among the arguments that went unaddressed were 
contentions that quasi in rem jurisdiction violated procedural 
due pro~ess,9~ and that it was at  variance with developing no- 
tions of res judicata requiring that a single claim be litigated 
once in a single forum.s5 In addition, the Court did not deal with 
the claim that the expansion of in personam jurisdiction made 
possible by International Shoe left quasi in rem jurisdiction 
constitutionally superfluous. 
However, the concurrences of Justices Powell and Stevens 
signaled that the opinion was susceptible of a much narrower 
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon 
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L Rev. 457,469 (1897). It is not enough to say 
that quasi in rem jurisdiction can be used constitutionally so long ns its use conforms to 
minimum contacts standards. As Chief Justice Burger reminded us not long ngo, "dl 
that is good is not commanded by the Constitution and all that is bad is not forbidden 
by it." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 228 (1971). 
91 Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisinnn, 1965 SUP. CT. Rev. 1, 
30 (describing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)). 
Professor Casad, for example, wrote that Shaffer "ring[s] the death h e l l  for the 
use of provisional remedies [attachment] as devises for obtaining jurisdiction. The lim- 
ited form of jurisdiction available through the qunsi in rern jurisdiction promhue new 
can rarely, if ever, be obtained through those measures except under circumstances that 
would justify broader in personam jurisdiction." R CASAD, supra note 41, nt 2-51 (1983). 
BS See, e.g., id.; Farrell, supra note 14, a t  450; but see Smit, supra note 13, n t  631 
("Shaffer is of most limited significance . . . ."). 
" Indeed, the Court expressly reserved this issue. See note 206 and nccompmying 
text infra. 
95 See notes 223-231 and accompanying text infra. 
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interpretation that would preserve quasi in rern jurisdiction in 
much the way it had been used in the past. This approach would 
prohibit the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction only in cases like 
Shaffer, in which the attached property was intangible and was 
subject to attachment in the state only because state law arbi- 
trarily placed the property within the state's juri~diction.~~ Ad-
ditionally, some commentators argued for the continued vitality 
of quasi in rern jurisdiction when there was no alternative fo- 
rum:' or when there were contacts, but not enough to justify 
full in personam jurisdi~tion.~~ Nevertheless, the clear majority 
of commentators predicted that the opinion would probably lead 
to a drastic curtailment, if not elimination, of quasi in rern 
jurisdi~tion.~~ 
In the thirteen years since Shaffer, the Supreme Court has 
not helped solve the mystery.loO Aside from Rush u. Sauchuk,lol 
a single opinion dealing with one of the more extreme uses of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction from the days prior to Shaffer, the 
Court has not returned to this topic. However, the issue has per- 
colated for a sufficient time in the state courts and the legisla- 
tures for states to have considered for themselves whether, and 
88 See Riesenfeld, supra note 13, a t  1189; Silberman, supra note 3, at  74-76; Smit, 
supra note 13, a t  524-29. 
Silberman, supra note 3, a t  76-77; Riesenfeld, supra note 13, a t  1197. 
See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 3, a t  71-72. 
See, e.g., R. CASAD, supra note 41; Chase, supra note 13; Silberman, supra note 3; 
Zammit, supra note 13. 
loo Other mysteries unresolved by Shaffer included the following questions: did tho 
opinion mean that the property that is attached must be related in some way to tho 
underlying claim? J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 163.64 
(1985). Would Shaffer apply to property brought into the state voluntarily and left for 
substantial periods of time? Smit, supra note 13, a t  529-31. What about attachment of 
property to enforce a judgment entered in another state, or to secure property from re- 
moval pending the outcome of litigation? Riesenfeld, supra note 13, a t  1196-97; Silbor- 
man, supra note 3, a t  77-79; Zammit, supra note 13, a t  18-19. Did the opinion mean that 
the limited appearance which permitted a person to appear and defend an action with- 
out subjecting himself to full in personam jurisdiction was now abolished? Silborman, 
supra note 3, a t  67 n.185. 
lo' 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In Rush, the Court invalidated the Seider doctrine undor 
which quasi in rern jurisdiction was used to compel a nonresident to defend a personal 
injury action in the forum state solely because his insurance company was located thoro. 
The Court held that this "ingenious jurisdictional theory," id. a t  328, was unconstitu- 
tional because: "[Tlhe fictitious presence of the insurer's obligation in Minnesota [tho 
forum state] does not, without more, provide a basis for concluding that there is any 
contact in the International Shoe sense between Minnesota and the insured." Id. a t  329- 
30. 
Heinonline - -  55 Brook. L. Rev. 1 0 8 0  1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0  
19901 NEW QUASI IN REhf JURISDICTION 1081 
to what extent, they wish to reject, or to retain quasi in rem 
jurisdiction. Until now, there has not been a report of how the 
states have responded to Shaffer. The following section consid- 
ers the current status of quasi in rem jurisdiction in the United 
States. 
11. QUASI N REM JURISDICTION IN THE STATES AFTER Shaffer 
A post-Shaffer survey of quasi in rem jurisdiction law in the 
states reveals that the widely predicted retirement of quasi in 
rem jurisdiction has, for the most part, come to pass. However, 
there also has been an unexpected and opposing development. 
New York, followed in varying degrees by nine other jurisdic- 
tions, has created a new rationale and reinvigorated life for quasi 
in rem jurisdiction.lo2 The forty remaining states have not yet 
endorsed this theory. Indeed, in most of these states the use of 
quasi in rem jurisdiction since Shaffer has simply faded. The 
diminished use of quasi in rem jurisdiction coincides with a 
steady expansion of in personam jurisdiction, and a contraction 
of attachment jurisdiction due to procedural due process de- 
fenses.lo3 However, in the future these states may be influenced 
by the new quasi in rem jurisdiction since only three of the forty 
states that do not use quasi in rem jurisdiction have explicitly 
rejected the doctrine through legislation or case law. It is thus 
possible that this survey has detected the emergence of a new 
national doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The serious con- 
stitutional and public policy questions that this new form of 
quasi in rem jurisdiction presents will be explored in the final 
section of this Article. First, however, this section reports the 
results of the survey. 
A. States That Have Rejected Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction 
Since Shaffer only three states have rejected quasi in rem 
jurisdiction. In 1979, the Vermont state legislature amended its 
attachment law to eliminate quasi in rem jurisdiction. The 
change mas made: 
to take account of the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner . . . that attach- 
ment of assets at the commencement of an action is no longer n con- 
lo* See notes 134-74 and accompanying text infra. 
'OS See notes 129-32 and accompanying text infra. 
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stitutionally valid way of obtaining jurisdiction over a nonresident in 
the absence of any other contacts with the state . . . . Since Ver- 
mont's long-arm statute . . . stretches to the limits of due process, the 
defendant's person will be subject to the jurisdiction of the court in 
any case in which the contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction 
. . . . Only if one of the other grounds for an ex parte attachment, 
which involve the danger that the defendant will abscond with or im- 
peril the security, is present will an ex parte hearing be in order.lO' 
In Michigan, a state court declared unconstitutional the 
quasi in rem law, which permitted quasi in rem jurisdiction only 
when personal jurisdiction could not be obtained.lo5 Since Mich- 
igan's long arm statute reached "to the farthest extent permit- 
ted by due process,"10e the court held that the law was unconsti- 
tutional because it would allow "jurisdiction over defendants in 
derogation of the minimum contacts standard."lo7 Finally, in 
Nebraska, the state attachment statute108 was amended to elimi- 
nate quasi in rem jurisdiction after a federal court held the at- 
tachment law unconstitutional on procedural due process 
B. States That Have Not Used Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction 
Since Shaffer 
Thirty-seven states, the great "silent majority," retain stat- 
l M  V.R.C.P. 4.1 at  21 (amended 1979) (see Reporter's notes a t  20). 
Ion MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 3 600.401 (West 1987). 
'OB City Suburban Agency v. Dade Helicopter Serv., 141 Mich. App. 241, 242, 366 
N.W.2d 259, 260 (1985). 
lo' Id., 366 N.W.2d a t  261. 
Ion NEB. REV. STAT. 3 25-1001 (1985). 
log The case was Arron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Berman, 431 F. Supp. 847,849 (D, Nob. 
1977). In Berman, the plaintiff sought to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction under tho No- 
braska attachment statute on the sole ground that the defendant was a nonresident of 
the state. The plaintiff argued that attachment without a prior hearing or opportunity to 
be heard was permissible notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion in Fuontos v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The district court disagreed, holding that "[pllaintiff has not 
asserted an argument founded in reason or logic as to why procedural safeguards should 
be less stringent in foreign attachment situations." Berman, 431 F. Supp. a t  852. 
While the opinion required no more than a change in the statute to provide proco- 
dural safeguards should quasi in rem jurisdiction be sought, the amended attachment 
statute eliminated nonresidency alone as a proper basis for attachment. The effect of tho 
new statute, therefore, was to render quasi in rem jurisdiction unavailable in Nebraska 
unless the plaintiff is able to show additional facts that make seizure necessary to pro- 
serve the property, such as an intent to defraud creditors, or an effort to avoid servico of 
process. See NEB. REV. STAT. 3 25-1001(1), (2) and (3) (1980). 
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utory authorization for pre-judgment attachment when the de- 
fendant is a nonresident or a foreign corp~ration."~ In these 
states, however, there are no opinions since Shaffer which ex- 
plicitly approve quasi in rem jurisdiction."' The absence of re- 
ported cases does not necessarily mean that quasi in rem juris- 
diction is not being used in these states since the statutory 
authority for it has not been repealed, and most cases are not 
officially reported. However, there are two reasons why it is un- 
likely that quasi in rem jurisdiction is enjoying continued vital- 
ity in these states. 
First, in a number of states the only references found after 
ALA CODE 6-6-41 to 53 (1975); ALASKA STAT. 09.40.010 (1983); ARIZ Rev. 
STAT. ANN. 8 12-1570.01 (1986); ARK STAT. ANN. 16-110-402 (1987) (garnishment) and 5 
16-110-101 (Mich. 1987) (attachment); CAL. [CIV. PROC] CODE 5 494.010 (Wat  1979 6: 
Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. 8 102 (West 1973) and lQ3 (1973 6: Supp. 1988); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 52-284 (West 1953); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3506 (1974); GA CODE 
ANN. 8 18-3-1 (Harrison 1982 & Supp. 1988); HAW. Rev. STAT. G1-1 16 -21 (1985 6: 
Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE $ 8-501 to -505 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 2 4-101 (Smith- 
Hurd 1981) (attachment); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-11-1 (\Vest 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
639.3 (West 1946 & Supp. 1988); KAN. CIV. PROC CODE ANN. 60-701 (Vernon 1983) 
(attachment); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 3 425.301 (hlichie/Bobbs-hlerrill 1988); h l e  REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14,s 1451 (West 1989); W. R CIV. P. 4.1, h k s .  GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223,s 42 
(West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. 521.010 (Vernon 1949); hiom. CODE ANN. 27-18-101 
(1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.017 (hlichie 1953 Se. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. a 2 6 - 2  
(West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 39-4-2 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE 32-08-03 (Supp. 1987); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (Anderson 1970); O m  STAT. ANN. tit. 12,s 1151 OVat 
1988); OR REV. STAT. 29.115 (1985). OR R CN. P. 84 A(2)(b) nnd (c); RL GEN. LAWS 5 
10-5-2 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. 15-19-10 (Law. Co-op. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
21-17A-3 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. 29-6-101 (1980); TEx [CIV. PRAC 6: REX] CODE A h i  
3 16.002 (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. 8.01-534 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 
6.25.030 (Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE 3 38-7-2 (1985); R)IS STAT. ANN. 801.07 (West 1977 
& Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. 8 1-15-201 (1988). 
'11 There are opinions in these jurisdictions approving the use of attachment for the 
purpose of obtaining security or to enforce a judgment, or to determine ownership of 
property, but there is no indication of the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction to obtain 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the type of disputes dealt with in th is Article. See, eg., Hug- 
gins v. Deinhard, 134 Mi. 98,102,654 P.2d 32,36 (1982) C6[t]he present case is distin- 
guishable from Shnffer in that a California court, with in personam jurisdiction over 
appellant, has entered a judgment. . .'3; Levi S t r a w  v. Crochet hiotor Sales, Inc, 293 
Ark. 502, 507, 739 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1987) (Quasi in rem jurisdiction .sought not "as a 
means by which to adjudicate a claim. . . i t  [the plninm hod already obtained a judg- 
ment against [the defendant who] lived and worked in Arkansns!'); WiLlinmson v. Wil- 
liamson, 247 Ga 260, 263, 275 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1981) ("[Ilf i t  can be shorm thnt the de- 
fendant has property in this state, there would be no diiculty in enforcing the Ariim 
judgment against him here."); Rodrigues v. Rodrigues, 747 P.2d 1281 (Hnrr. App. 1987) 0 
(quasi in rem jurisdiction for purpose of determining ownership between spouses sf 
property located in the state); Black v. Black, 119 R L  127. 377 k 2 d  1308 (1977) (up- 
holding the attachment of a non-resident's property to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction). 
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Shaffer to quasi in rern jurisdiction show a newly found reluc- 
tance to make use of the doctrine. This indicates that Shaffer 
has had a sobering impact on the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction 
in these states. New Jersey is a good example. In McQueeny o. 
J. W. Fergusson & Sons Inc.,'12 the federal district court for New 
Jersey declared that, given Shaffer, "[tlhe status of the remedy 
of attachment in New Jersey is in considerable doubt.""3 The 
New Jersey statute at issue in McQueeny allowed quasi in rem 
jurisdiction when a summons could not be served in the State of 
New Jer~ey.""~ To avoid constitutional problems, the court con- 
strued this statute to mean that pre-judgment attachment of 
property would only be permitted when the defendant seeks to 
"frustrate effective service by concealment or in absconding 
from the state."l16 
Delaware, the site of the Shaffer litigation, has exhibited a 
similar hesitancy about quasi in rern jurisdiction. In Institute 
Bancario Italiano v. Hunter,l16 the plaintiff commenced a stock 
fraud case using quasi in rern jurisdiction against a Dutch corpo- 
ration and a Dutch citizen. Jurisdiction was based upon pre- 
judgment attachment of the stock.l17 In this case, unlike Shaf- 
fer, plaintiff argued, not without rea~on,"~ that quasi in rern ju- 
risdiction was proper because the property attached was directly 
related to the litigation."" The Delaware court, however, re- 
jected the attempted use of quasi in rern jurisdiction.120 A num- 
n2 527 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.J. 1981). 
"3 Id. at  730. 
"' Id. a t  730-31 (citing N.J. REV. STAT. $ 2A:26-2 (1948)). 
Id. a t  732. 
449 A.2d 210 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982). 
"' The plaintiff relied upon DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, 5 365 (1974), the Delaware so- 
questration statute that was invoked by plaintiff in Shaffer. See note 65 and nccompany- 
ing text supra. 
'IB Hunter, 449 A.2d a t  217. In Hunter, the property attached was the very subject 
of the controversy since the question raised was whether the shares issued by the corpo- 
ration were fraudulent. This is in contrast with Shaffer where the stock attached had no 
connection to the litigation. See notes 64, 79, 83 and accompanying text supra. 
I l8  Plaintiff also argued that the state had a strong interest in the litigation becauso 
i t  dealt with whether the stock issuances of a Delaware corporation were frnudulont or 
not. The jurisdictional argument was buttressed by the observation that there was no 
alternative forum, at  least in the United States, that could hear the case. Ilunter, 449 
A.2d at  216. 
The court rejected the attempt to use quasi in rern jurisdiction notwithstanding 
the fact that the stock was the subject matter of the lawsuit, that the Delaware Court of 
Chancery would be best able to tailor an efficient and speedy remedy, that the cnse in- 
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ber of other states have given strong indicat.ions that quasi in 
rem jurisdiction after Shaffer is difficult to obtain, including 
Alaska,12' Calif~rnia,'~~ Conne~t icu t ,~~~  Kentucky,124 Massachu- 
volved international, and not merely interstate, parties and activity, and that D e I n ~ w e  
had a vital interest in the prevention of abuse in the adminiitration of its corporate law. 
Id. a t  222. The court relied on the fact that the property attached r;ns fictional in the 
sense that i t  rras only by dint of state law that the "situs" of the stack ria p l o d  in 
Delaware even though the physical location of the stack r ~ o s  ekewhere. Id. a t  221. The 
court's holding on the quasi in rem jurisdiction question rvas dicta bemuse the court 
upheld in personam jurisdiction based on a "conspiracy" theory. Id. a t  225. 
lZ1 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Bay Ridge, 509 F. Supp. 1115, 1121 (D. Alffih 
1981) ("Shaffer invalidated the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction os m intrinsically nde- 
quate basis of jurisdiction."). 
lZ2 In California, the state courts before Shaffer gave a clear statement of support 
for quasi in rem jurisdiction. A California court confronting a due process W e n g e  to 
the state's pre-judgment attachment law upheld the Inw on the grounds that: 
The creditor's need to safeguard the collectibility of a judgment is substan- 
tially greater when the debtor is a nonresident than when he is a resident. for o 
nonresident has contacts and roots outside the state which make i t  fnr more 
likely he will be willing and able to transfer assets outside the state to defeat 
his creditor's recovery than is true in the case of a resident debtor. 
Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 CaL App. 3d 413,419, 100 cd 
Rptr. 233,237 (1972). The cowtadhered to this view despite its recognition that "mod- 
em long arm statutes have substantially reduced the need for foreign attachment." Id. 
Despite the strong support for jurisdictional pre-judgment attachment, hor;ever, there 
are no reported post-Shaffer opinions in California in which quasi in rem jurisdiction has 
been successfully obtained even though the California Inw continues to aulhorize pre- 
judgment attachment based solely on the nonresidence of the defendant. Indeed, what 
indications there are point to the conclusion that currently quasi in rem jurisdiction is 
not favored in California 
Nakasone v. Randall, 129 CaL App. 3d 757, 181 Cd. Rptr. 324 (1982), is the o d y  
reported California opinion in which a party sought q u a i  in rern jurisdiction of the see- 
ond type. The attempt was unsuccessful. In Nakasone, the plnintiff sued an 86-yeu-old 
nonresident for breach of contract for the sale of a parcel of r ed  property l m t e d  in 
Mexico by attaching the defendant's property in Cnlifornia The court held that 
"[nlonresident attachment is designed to operate where peraonal jurisdiction of a de- 
fendant cannot be obtained, but quasi in rern jurisdiction con be obtained b seizure of 
the nonresident's property in the state." Id. a t  760, 181 CnL Rptr. nt 326. However, the 
court vacated the writ of attachment because the 1977 amendments to the attachment 
laws limiting attachment to situations in which the claim arose out of on indik5dunl's 
"trade, business or profession," CAI. [CIV. PROC.] CODE 3 483.016 (\%St 19771, \ Y a  not 
satisfied. The only California cases that have granted quasi in rern jurkdiction d t u  
Shaffer are limited to enforcement of judgments. Gingold v. Gingold, 161 C d  App. 3d 
1177,208 CaL Rptr. 123 (19%) (enforcement of chid  support order). For o critical e ~ d u -  
ation of the California attachment law, although not on this bsis ,  see Comment, Abuse 
of Process and Attachment: Torcard a Balance of POICP~, 30 UCLA L 1218 [1933). 
Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48,459 k 4 d  503 (1933) (placing the 
burden of proof on plaintiff to establish the minimum contacts necessary for q u a i  in 
rern jurisdiction, and remanding for a hearing). 
lZ4 A recent decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court, Citizens Bmk and Trust (20. 
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~ e t t s , ' ~ ~  Oregon,12e Washington,12' and West Virginia.12B 
Second, the remaining states cannot be counted as continu- 
ing to approve quasi in rern jurisdiction absent a reported opin- 
ion stating as much. Given the serious questions raised about 
of Peducah v. Collins, 762 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1988), casts doubt on the realistic possibility 
of quasi in rern jurisdiction in that state. In Citizens Bank, the plaintiff sued to recover 
on a promissory note by attaching the nonresident defendant's property in the state. Tho 
court interpreted Shaffer as standing for the proposition that when the "state could not 
constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendants, the state was dso  
barred from exercising quasi in rern jurisdiction over them." Id, at  412. The dissenting 
judge protested that the majority's decision was "premised on a fundamental misundor- 
standing of the nature of quasi in rern jurisdiction." Id. a t  413 (Leibson, J., dissenting). 
In the dissent's opinion, Shaffer was limited to the use of property that is no moro than 
a "tenuous legal fiction." Id. a t  414. In the instant case, the dissent argued that the real 
property attached was not fictional, and that minimum contacts were established by tho 
defendant's borrowing of money from a Kentucky bank and by the presence of the prop- 
erty in the state. The majority's failure to uphold jurisdiction on these facts, the dissent 
claimed, "will unduly interfere with commercial transactions within this state . . . ." Id. 
a t  414. 
Iz6 Morrill v. Tong, 390 Mass. 120, 127-28, 453 N.E.2d 1221, 1226-27 (1983) (ac- 
knowledges that constitutional issues that have not been resolved by state courts are 
posed by the assertion of quasi in rern jurisdiction after Shaffer). 
Paulson Inv. Co., Inc. v. Norbay Securities, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 616, 619 (D. Or. 
1984). ("Although the quasi in rern doctrine has not been formally abrogated, tho moro 
presence of stock in Oregon is not sufficient given the Supreme Court's opinion in Shal. 
fer v. Heitner."). 
Iz7 Even before Shaffer, Washington courts were skeptical about quasi in rern juris- 
diction. In Ace Novelty Co. v. M.W. Kasch Co., 82 Wash. 2d 145, 508 P.2d 1366 (19731, 
four years prior to Shaffer, the Washington Supreme Court observed that "conditions of 
doing business in this country have changed remarkably" since the days of Pennoyer. Id. 
a t  148,508 P.2d a t  1368. These changes, as well as a recognition of the "grave injustices" 
possible when attachment is obtained, led the court to reject pre-judgment attachment 
unless there is "jurisdiction over the proceeding against the principal defendant." Id. at  
149,508 P.2d a t  1368. This cryptic holding led one commentator to wonder whether tho 
court was "in fact rejecting a quasi in rern analysis as a basis for jurisdiction in tho 
future!' Trautman, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in Washington, 61 WASH. 
L. Rev. 1,28 (1975). Professor Trautman concluded that the Ace Novelty opinion might 
well mean that in Washington, "if a defendtint is not subject to in personam jurisdiction, 
as through the long-arm statute, he may not be reached through a quasi in rern analy- 
sis." Id. a t  30. The absence of any reported opinions in Washington making use of quasi 
in rern jurisdiction confirms Professor Trautman's observations. 
In Gee v. Gibbs, 162 W. Va. 821, 253 S.E.2d 140 (1979), the West Virginia Su- 
preme Court expressed serious doubts about the constitutionality of quasi in rom juris- 
diction in light of Shaffer and amendments to the state's long-arm statute extending in 
personam jurisdiction to the limits of due process. The court, in remanding the cnso to 
the trial court for consideration of the constitutional question, suggested that attach- 
ment jurisdiction might well be unconstitutional. Id. a t  n.3, 253 S.E.2d 140 a t  n.3 (citing 
with approval Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the 
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973) (arguing that pre-judgment attachment is uncon- 
stitutional whenever personal jurisdiction can be obtained)). 
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quasi in rem jurisdiction, it is reasonable to expect that if it rras 
used in a particular jurisdiction, there would be, in the thirteen 
years since Shaffer, at least one reported opinion examining or 
commenting on its use, or a t  least acknowledging its existence. 
However, there is not the slightest suggestion in the reported 
opinions of these states that the concept has any remaining life. 
If, then, these states do not actually use quasi in rem juris- 
diction, what accounts for this rather dramatic fall from popu- 
larity? Tho explanations come to mind. First, in the decade 
since Shaffer there has been a steady expansion of long arm ju- 
risdi~ti0n.l~~ This expansion significantly lessens the need for 
IZ* In some states in the post-Shaffer decade, courts have issued broad interpretn- 
tions of the state long arm statute. See, e.g., Helitzer v. Helitzer, 761 F.2d 582 (1Qth Cir. 
1985); Poyner v. Erma Werke GhfBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 US. 
841 (1980); Pioneer Ins. Co. v. Gelt, 558 F.2d 1303 (8th Cir. 1977); RI. Hosp. Trust Nnt'l 
Bank v. San Gabriel Hydroelectric Partnership, 667 F. Supp. 66 @.RL 1981); Beh V. 
Ostergard, 657 F. Supp. 173 @.N.hl. 1987); Horizons Inc. v. Avco Corp., 551 F. Supp. 
771 0.S.D. 1982); Harman v. Pauley, 522 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. IV. V V ~  1981); hfonetary 
Corp. v. Chesney, 514 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. hlich. 1960); Hiii Corner I n c  v. Intlight Cin- 
ema Intern. Inc., 505 F. Supp. 12 (h5.D. Tenn. 1980); Standnrd Tollow Corp. v. Jowdy, 
190 Conn. 48,459 k 2 d  503 (1983); Tyson v. Whitaker 6: Son Inc, 407 k 2 d  1 (hfe. 1979); 
Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132,395 k 2 d  464 (1978); State v. Continental Forms Inc, 356 
N.iV.2d 442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Chittenden Trust Co. v. Binnchi, 530 k 2 d  569 Wt. 
1987). 
In addition, a number of state long arm statutes have been interpreted hs extending 
to the limits of due process. See, e.g., ALA. R CIV. P. 4.2; ALASKA STAT. $ 09.05.615 (1983); 
ARE. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 10-106 (amended 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. $ 16-4-101 (1975); GAL 
[CIV.] CODE 410.10 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. $ 13-1-124 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. 5 52-57a (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN, TRIAL R 4.4; KAN. CN. PROC CODE ANN. 3 
60-308 (Vernon 1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 3 454.210 (hlichie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); 
ME REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 14 ,s  704a (1964 & Supp. 1988); hiD. [CTS 6: JUD. PROG.] CODE 
ANN. 6103 (1957 & Supp. 1988); hficn Coaw. LAIS'S ANN. $ 600.705 (\Vat 1975); hfihx 
STAT. ANN. 5 .543.19 ( k t  1982); NEB. REV. STAT. $ 25-536(2) (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. 510.4 (1969); N.hL STAT. ANN. $ 38-1-16 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3 2307.38.2 
(Anderson 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 3 2004 (\Vest 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, 3 
5308 (Purdon 1978); ILL GEN. LAWS $9-5-33 (reenacted 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. $ 36-2-803 
(Law. Co-op. 1962); SD. CODIFIED LAIS'S ANN. 3 15-7-2 (1965); TENti. CODE ANN. 3 20-2- 
214 (Supp. 1988); TEX REV. Cnr STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1959); UTAH CODE ANN. $ 
78-27-22 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, $ 855 (1947); Ivan REV. CODE 5 4.28.18 (1959); 
IV- VA. CODE $ 56-3-33 (Supp. 1988); FYrS STAT. ANN. $ 801.05 (\Vest 1976); IVso. STAT. § 
5-1-107 (1967, amended 1977). In all of these states there are court decisions thnt have 
interpreted the long arm statute to extend to the full limits of the due p r o w s  dnuse. 
However, these decisions are subject to a caveat. It is possible that the courts do not 
mean that the statute covers all the situations in which jurisdiction under International 
Shoe would be possible, only that for the topics covered, the statute exerts tho full power 
permitted under the Constitution. See generally R CMAD, supra note 41, a t  4-4. In any 
event, i t  is clear that in these states the long arm statute "should be construed v e q  
liberally." Id. a t  4-5. 
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quasi in rern jurisdiction, which was developed in large part be- 
cause of limitations on state courts' ability to obtain jurisdiction 
over nonresidents.lgO The expansion also suggests that many 
states have opted to respond to Shaffer by amending long arm 
acts, rather than searching for a new rationale to support quasi 
in rern jurisdiction. 
Second, in a number of states there has been litigation chal- 
lenging the state's attachment laws on procedural due process 
grounds.lg1 As a result of these attacks, the requirements for ob- 
taining pre-judgment attachment have stiffened significantly.lga 
The increased difficulty of obtaining an order of attachment in 
these jurisdictions may have dampened the enthusiasm of coun- 
sel and courts for quasi in rern jurisdiction. 
The absence of any reported opinions, the expansion of long 
arm jurisdiction, and the tightening of procedural requirements 
for pre-judgment attachment support the conclusion that, at 
present, quasi in rern jurisdiction has no meaningful role to play 
in many states. However, this conclusion must be tempered by 
the recognition that a new approach to quasi in rern jurisdiction 
is emerging. This new approach might begin to influence those 
states that have not used quasi in rern jurisdiction since Shaffer, 
1 
13' See notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra. 
I3l See, e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Maudlin, 851 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1988); Watertown 
Equipment Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, N.A., 830 F.2d 1487 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1985); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. Inc., 
639 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1981); Sugar v. Curtis Circulation, 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974) (three judge court), remanded, 425 U.S. 73 (1976); Stoller Fisheries Inc. v. Ameri- 
can Title Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 1977); Hillhouse v. Kansas City, 221 Kan. 369, 
559 P.2d 1148 (1977); Penrod Drilling Co. v. Bounds, 433 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1983); Wil- 
liams v. Matovich, 172 Mont. 109, 560 P.2d 1338 (1977); First Nat'l Bank of Santa Fo v. 
Southwest Yacht & Marine Supply Corp., 101 N.M. 431,684 P.2d 517 (1984); Peobles v. 
Clement, 63 Ohio St. 2d 314,408 N.E.2d 689 (1980); Guy H. James Const. Co, v. Depart- 
ment of Transp., 655 P.2d 553 (Okla. 1982); Rocky B. Fisheries Inc. v. North Bond 
Fabrication & Mach. Inc., 66 Or. App. 625, 676 P.2d 319 (1984); Yanero v. Fox, 163 W. 
Va. 222, 256 S.E.2d 751 (1979). 
IS' For a description of the tightening of the procedural requirements that havo 
taken place in one state as a result of this kind of litigation, see note 200 infra. 
Other changes to the attachment laws evidence a t  least an implicit legislative rejec- 
tion of the concept of quasi in rern jurisdiction. Illinois, for example, rovised its law to 
provide a specific section authorizing the courts of that state to make use of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, ll 12-611 (Smith-Hurd 1982). However, the statuto is 
limited to enforcement of judgments. This limited statute gives rise to a reasonable pro- 
sumption that the legislature did not intend for its courts to continue to make uso of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction of the second type. The absence of a single reported caso in 
which the plaintiff sought this type of pre-judgment attachment buttresses this opinion. 
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but have not yet rejected it either. Thus, it is premature to pro- 
claim the death of quasi in rem jurisdiction in America. We turn 
now to examine the development of the new quasi in rem 
jurisdiction. 
C. The New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction 
In contrast to the trend away from the use of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction in many parts of the country, in some states, most 
notably New York, the doctrine has been revived despite Shaf- 
fer.ls3 This dramatic development has taken place, for the most 
part, without legislative authorization. This section describes the 
new doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction and considers its 
causes. 
1. The Development and Rationale for the New Quasi in 
Rem Jurisdiction in New York 
The most influential case in the development of the new 
doctrine of quasi in rem jurisdiction is the New York Court of 
Appeals' 1984 decision in Banco Ambrosiano u. Artoc Bank and 
Trust Co.ls4 In that case Banco Ambrosiano, an Italian bank, 
sued to recover a fifteen million dollar loan to Artoc, a Baha- 
mian bank. The loan was negotiated in Italy, the Bahamas and 
Peru; the proceeds were to be used in South America. The sole 
New York connection with the transaction was that the loan was 
to be made in United States dollars to a New York account that 
Artoc maintained, and was to be repaid to another New York 
account established by Banco Ambrosiano. The reason for this 
was "that the transaction was to be in United States dollars and 
therefore had to be handled through such clearing accounts."130 
l" This development has been little noticed by commentators. Indeed, they pre- 
dicted early in the game that Shnffer would virtually eliminate qunsi in rem jurisdiction 
in New York. A leading commentator on New York practice voiced this sentiment by 
declariig that the Shaffer holding had "drastically restricted" the use of qunsi in rem 
jurisdiction in the state. D. SEGEL, HANDBOOK N NEW YORK PRACTICE :6 104, nt  122 
(1978). Another claimed that Shnffer had abolished quasi in rem jurisdiction. Fanell, 
supra note 14, at 449 ("In June, 1977, the Court decided unanimously in S M e r  v. Heit- 
ner that the states may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction."). Nevertheless, the cases 
prove otherwise; quasi in rem jurisdiction is alive and well in New York See note3 134- 
70 and accompanying text infra. 
lS4 62 N.Y.2d 65,464 N.E.2d 432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984). 
lSs Id. at 69-70,464 N.E.2d at 434,476 N.Y.S.2d a t  66. 
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Banco Ambrosiano attached Artoc's bank account, its "sole con- 
tact" with New York State.13$ In the ensuing jurisdictional chal- 
lenge, Banco Ambrosiano conceded that the New York long arm 
statute did not provide grounds for the assertion of in personam 
jurisdiction over Artoc.13' However, Banco Ambrosiano argued 
that the attachment of Artoc's New York bank account was suf- 
ficient to provide quasi in rern jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals unanimously upheld jurisdiction. 
Chief Judge Wachtler, writing for the court, began by noting 
that "at first blush, the usefulness of quasi in rern jurisdiction 
has been eliminated by Shaffer."13$ This was so because the New 
York state legislature had authorized quasi in rern jurisdiction 
when its conceptual foundation derived solely from the presence 
of property within the state.lgO With Shaffer and International 
Shoe, however, the common law structure that had supported 
the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction fell.140 Thereafter, a state, if 
it wished, could obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full 
extent permitted by due process even if the nonresidents had no 
physical presence or property in the state. 
Nevertheless, the Banco Ambrosiano court held that the 
limited reach of New York's long arm statute provided a ration- 
ale for the continued use of quasi in rern jurisdiction. The court 
found it "important" that "CPLR 302 [New York's long arm 
statute] does not go as far as is constitutionally permissible."141 
Without further elaboration, the Court deemed the statutory 
constraints of the long arm statute created a "gap" that quasi in 
rern jurisdiction could fill. The court reasoned as follows: 
CPLR 302 does not provide for in personam jurisdiction in every case 
in which due process would permit it. Thus, a "gap" exists in which 
the necessary minimum contacts, including the presence of defend- 
ant's property within the State, are present, but personal jurisdiction 
is not authorized by CPLR 302. It is appropriate, in such case, to fill 
that gap utilizing quasi in rem  principle^."^ 
IS6 Id.  at 70, 464 N.E.2d at 434, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 66. 
IS' Id.  
ISS Id.  
IS8 The court pointed to CPLR 301 which, when it took effect in 1963, fourtoon 
years prior to Shaffer, was intended to preserve "all previously existing jurisdictional 
bases." Id.  at 71, 464 N.E.2d at 434, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 66. 
I4O Id .  at 70-71, 464 N.E.2d at 434-35, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 66-67. 
14' Id.  at 71, 464 N.E.2d at 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 67. 
Id. at 71-72, 464 N.E.2d at 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 67. The court relied upon an 
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The court interpreted Shaffer in a way that did not consti- 
tutionally prohibit the court from using quasi in rem jurisdiction 
to fill the gap in New York's long arm statute. Chief Judge 
Wachtler stated that Shaffer stood for the proposition that 
quasi in rem jurisdiction was unconstitutional only when the 
"property has no relationship to the cause of action, and there 
are no other ties among the defendant, the forum and the litiga- 
ti~n."'"~ The court held that Artoc's bank account was "closely 
related to plaintSs claim," because i t  was into this account that 
the proceeds of the loan were to be paid,lJ4 Artoc regularly used 
the account for other transactions, and Artoc had agreed to re- 
pay the loan to Banco Ambrosiano's New York 
Therefore, the court held quasi in rem jurisdiction was constitu- 
tional in the Banco Ambrosiano case. 
Even before Banco Ambrosiano, New York courts140 had 
made free use of quasi in rem jurisdiction, without much discus- 
sion of its theoretical basis beyond an attempt to demonstrate 
that it was constitutional under Shaffer.lJ7 Since Banco Ambro- 
Albany Law Review Note for its authority for this proposition. Note, hfinimum Contacts 
and Jurisdictional Theory, supra note 13, a t  306. 
In developing its rationale for this post-Shaffer use of qunsi in rem jurisdiction, the 
Banco court did not deal with the argument that absent substantial justitlation, pre- 
judgment attachment may violate defendant's right to full use of property ptior to judg- 
ment, or that quasi in rem jurisdiction is inconsistent with res judicatn principle% For n 
discussion of the significance of these factors, see notes 198-231 nnd nccompmying text 
infra. 
Banco Ambrosiano, 62 N.Y.2d a t  71,464 N.E.2d a t  435,476 N.Y.S.2d nt  67. 
14' Id. a t  72, 464 N.E.2d a t  435, 476 N.Y.S.2d a t  67. 
Id. a t  73,464 N.E.2d at 436,476 N.Y.S.2d a t  68. 
The term "New York courts" encompasses federal as well as stnto courts since, as 
will be shown, the federal courts, exercising diversity jurisdiction, hnve mnde liberal we 
of quasi in rem jurisdiction in New York. Interestingly, however, the federal courts hnve 
not contributed to the articulation of the rationale for the new qunsi in rern jurisdiction. 
While there are many reported federal cases making use of qunsi in rem jurisdiction 
under New York state law, see notes 154-57 and accompanying text suprs, none nddress 
this question at all. They proceed rather on the assumption that quasi in rem jurisdic- 
tion is authorized in the state so long as in the circumstances of the cnse i t  am be consti- 
tutionally invoked. 
Two pre-Banco cases stand out. The first, Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. 
Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a federal district court opinion, is the more dmmntic. In 
Feder, plaintiff brought a wrongful death action arising out of an airplane crash neiu 
Istanbul, Turkey. The defendant airline compaay did not have an office or m y  employ- 
ees in New York, nor did i t  solicit business in the state. The only connection between the 
defendant and New York was a $100,000 New York bank account. This wns the property 
which plaintiff attached. It was unclear whether the account was relnted to the plaintif's 
cause of action. The court stated that "the circumstances surrounding the opening and 
Heinonline - -  55 Brook. L. Rev. 1091 1989-1990 
1092 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55: 1069 
siano, a host of New York cases have upheld the use of quasi in 
rern jurisdi~tion.'~~ From these additional cases, one gains a 
fuller appreciation of the new theory of quasi in rern jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  The new quasi in rern jurisdiction is used primarily to 
operation of THY'S bank account here are not revealed!' Id. at  1278. Howovor, tho court 
did not delve further since i t  held that this fact was unnecessary to its decision. See id. 
a t  1277. 
The court upheld the assertion of quasi in rern jurisdiction notwithstanding tho ab- 
sence of any other contacts between the defendant, the forum and the cause of action. 
The court chose to view the voluntary act of opening a bank account as supplying mini- 
mum contacts necessary to sustain jurisdiction. The court rejected the defendant's argu- 
ment that Shaffer prohibited jurisdiction premised on the mere presence, without moro, 
of unrelated property in the state. The court instead focused on Justice Stevens's con- 
curring opinion for the proposition that Shaffer was limited to intangible proporty 
brought into the state unintentionally. Thus, Shaffer did not prohibit attachment of tan. 
gible property like a bank account which is purposefully opened in the state. Id. a t  1278- 
79. 
So certain was the court of the correctness of its holding that i t  refused to certify tho 
defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal. In doing so, the court recorded its boliof 
that there is no substantial ground for a difference of opinion on the proposition that 
Shaffer "does not apply to an attachment o f .  . . a bank account." Id. a t  1280. Justice 
Marshall might have been surprised. 
The second major federal case in the development of quasi in rern jurisdiction in 
New York is the Second Circuit's opinion in Intermeat v. American Poultry, 576 F.2d 
1017 (2d Cir. 1978). The plaintiff seller sued an Ohio corporation for breach of contract 
regarding the shipment of poultry to New York. Quasi in rern jurisdiction was sought 
based upon the attachment of a debt owed to defendant by the A&P grocory chain, 
another New York corporation. Id. a t  1018. 
Although the debt was unrelated to plaintiffs cause of action, the court sustainod 
the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction. The court read Shaffer to mean that: 
[Plroceedings begun by attachment now means that the presence of defend- 
ant's property within New York must be viewed as only one contact of tho 
defendant with the state, to be considered along with other contacts in decid- 
ing whether the assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with "traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice!' 
Id. a t  1022 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)), 
Since the defendant did a substantial amount of business in New York, and sinco tho 
contract was negotiated with a New York plaintiff, the court found that minimum con- 
tacts were present in the case, although i t  acknowledged that the contacts wero insuffi- 
cient to satisfy New York's statutory requirements for the assertion of in porsonam juris- 
diction. Id. a t  1018-19. 
The federal courts in both Intermeat v. American Poultry, 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 
1978), and Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), recognized that 
the theoretical underpinnings for quasi in rern jurisdiction as expressed in Pennoyer 
were abrogated by Shaffer. Although the doctrinal bases for quasi in rern jurisdiction 
were shaken, these courts proceeded to exercise jurisdiction by simply grafting tho Shaf- 
fer decision upon the New York attachment statutes, presuming that the exorcise of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction was still authorized. 
Id8 See notes 149-68 and accompanying text infra. 
lde See notes 150-70 infra. 
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provide a New York forum for a plaintiff who otherwise would 
not be able to sue in New York because the defendant's relation- 
ship to the state does not fall within the long arm statute.160 
New York courts have made deep inroads into the limitations 
otherwise imposed by the long arm statute on the state's asser- 
tion of adjudicative power over nonresidents. Several cases illus- 
trate this trend. 
In Majique Fashions v. W a r w i ~ k , ~ ~ ~  for example, a Korean 
corporation's New York bank account was attached to adjudi- 
cate a claim arising out of the corporation's alleged tortious fail- 
ure to perform a contractual obligation in Hong Kong. The de- 
fendant had no offices or employees in New York, was not 
licensed to do business there, and owned no real estate or other 
property in the state, other than the single bank account which 
the plaintiff attached. On these facts, the plaintiffs chose to 
"forego any attempt at personal jurisdiction under the 'long 
arm' statute."162 The New York court, nevertheless, upheld 
quasi in rem jurisdiction based on attachment of the defendant's 
bank account.16s 
150 See notes 151-56 and accompanying text infra. 
l" 67 A.D.2d 321, 414 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1979). 
ln2 Id. a t  325, 414 N.Y.S.2d a t  919. Thii  apparently rvns a correct decision. On the 
facts alleged, N.Y. CN. PRAC. L & R. 302(a)(l) (hlcKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989) [hereinnf- 
ter CPLR], was not satisfied since the defendant had not physically negotiated or per- 
formed the contract in New York, which are two factors important in establishing the 
defendant's purposeful activities in New York, a necessary condition for jurisdiction 
under that provision. Trafalgar Capital Corp. v. Oil Producers Equip. Gorp., 555 F. 
Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); J.E.T. Advertising Associates, I n c  v. Lnvm King, Inc, 84 
kD.2d 744,443 N.Y.S.2d 744 (2d Dep't 1981); O'Connor, Long Arm Jurisdiction in Nela 
York Contract Cases, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 1982, a t  1, coL 2. The provision of CPLR 5 
302(a)(3) that permits jurisdiction over a nonresident who commits a tort outside the 
state having consequences in the state might have been more promising. T h t  prevision. 
however, requires that defendant either regularly solicit business in New York, or derive 
substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce, CPLR 302(4(3)(iI and 
(ii). It is conceivable that the plaintiff might have been able to sntisfy the latter condi- 
tion, but since he failed to allege facts about i t  the more reasonnble assumption is that 
he could not. 
lSS The court found that minimum contacts were present in this situation since i t  
noted that on these facts the defendant "expected or should reasombly expect its oct[s] 
to have consequences in New York." Majique, 67 A.D.2d a t  325,414 N.Y.S.2d a t  919. In 
discussing this case, Professor Siegel points out that using a foreseenbility element to 
determine the constitutionality of quasi in rem jurisdiction is risky. Hi reservntion is 
based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Jlrorld-Wide Volkswngen Gorp. v. W&n, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980). decided after hiajique, which seems to d i m i s  foreseeability as n 
major factor in long arm jurisdiction. But Professor Siegel distinguishes hiajique from 
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Drexel Burnham Lambert v. D'AngelolS4 is "another illus- 
tration of where activities insac ient  to support personal juris- 
diction (under the long arm statute) may nonetheless satisfy the 
apparently less demanding quasi in rem jurisdiction."lDD The 
plaintiff claimed that its own acts in New York concerning se- 
curity transfers were imputable to the defendant. Although at 
the time New York courts had refused to interpret the long arm 
statute in, this way,lS8 the court permitted quasi in rem jurisdic- 
tion based upon the attachment of defendant's New York 
The new quasi in rem jurisdiction is most commonly used in 
situations such as Drexel Burnham and Banco Ambrosiano, in 
which the defendant has engaged in business deals with New 
Yorkers without performing activities that fit within the fairly 
rigid limitations applicable to the "transacting business" provi- 
sion of the long arm statute.lS8 However, not all the cases are so 
limited. Some courts have allowed the new quasi in rem jurisdic- 
tion to be applied in situations that come squarely within the 
long arm statute.lSS For these courts, quasi in rem jurisdiction is 
almost second nature, to be used whenever a New Yorker wants 
to sue a nonresident who has property here.leO While these 
World- Wide Volkswagen, since Majique involved intentional conduct in a contract cnso 
while World- Wide Volkswagen was a tort action for personal injuries. D. SIEOEL, supra 
note 133, a t  3 104. Professor Siegel's distinction between tort and contract cases seems 
borne out by subsequent Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. V. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzev~icz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985). 
I M  453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
loo D. SIEGEL, supra note 133, a t  4 104 (1987 Supp.). 
IoB In actions by an agent against his foreign principal, New York courts havo ro- 
fused to attribute the acts of the agent to the principal for jurisdictional purposes under 
CPLR 302. The courts have required the defendant to engage in independent activity 
towards New York and actions of the agent cannot be deemed the defendant's indepon- 
dent activities. Drexel, 453 F. Supp. a t  1297. Recent developments indicate that this 
view may be changing. See Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460,522 N.E,2d 
40, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1988). 
lo' Drexel, 453 F. Supp. at  1298. 
Io8 See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Republic Nat'l Bank of New York v. Ahrnad Ladjevardi, No. 79-5203, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 26, 1980). 
loD See, e.g., Unitech USA, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 91 A.D.2d 903, 457 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st 
Dep't 1983). 
IB0 As one court put it: "[slince the nonresident defendant in most cases will not bo 
subject to in personam jurisdiction in New York, attachment is necessary . . . ." ACLI 
Int'l Commodity Sews., Inc. v. Grey, No. 80-7227, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1981). 
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courts have sometimes recognized that there is an inherent 
"harshness" that flows from the forceful attachment of an indi- 
vidual's property prior to a determination of liability, this has 
apparently not been a deterrent.lel 
Despite a clear receptivity to quasi in rern jurisdiction by 
New York courts, and some attempt a t  developing a theory for 
it, New York courts have failed to articulate clearly the parame- 
ters of the doctrine. For example, as some New York courts have 
interpreted the new quasi in rern jurisdiction, there must be a 
direct relationship between the property attached and the 
claim.le2 However, other courts have not required this connec- 
tion.le3 The latter group have split on whether or not other con- 
tacts with the jurisdiction are required; some hold that it is not 
neces~ary)1~~ while others appear to say that it is 
Some opinions stress the lack of any other forum for the plain- 
tifF as a key determinant;le6 others do not.le7 Those courts that 
Is' Standard Steel and Tinplate Corp. v. hianuel Int'l D.LS.C., Inc, No. 81-5118, 
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1981). 
Ie2 See, eg., Fit Palm Beach Int'l Bank v. Banco De Descuento, S.A., No. 85-3656 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file); Republic Nat'l Bnnk of New 
York v. Ahmad Ladjevardi, No. 79-5203, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,1980) (funds in at- 
tached bank account directly related to cause of action); Bnnm Ambrosiano v. Artcsc 
Bank & Trust, 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d 432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984) (cause of action 
directly related to bank account attached); Unitech USA, I n c  v. Ponsoldt, 91 A.D.2d 
903,457 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dep't 1983) (funds in escrow account that were attached wcre 
directly related to plaintws cause of action). 
leS See, e.g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc, 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1918) 
(attached bank account unrelated to plaintiffs claim); Excel Shipping Gorp. v. Seatrain 
Int'l, 584 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (voluntary act of 
opening unrelated bank account sufficient in itself to supply basis for quasi in rern 
jurisdiction). 
lB5 Intermeat, Inc v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978) (la& of 
connection between cause of action and attached property does not preclude q u a i  in 
rern jurisdiction so long as there are other contacts between the defendant m d  the forum 
state); Excel Shipping Corp. v. Seatrain Int'l, 584 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. D'Angelo, 453 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
lee Shaffer left open the possibility that in quasi in rem jurisdiction cnses the exer- 
cise of jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property might be constitutional if 
there is no other forum that could hear the suit available. Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t  211 n.37. 
This theme has been suggested in some New York quasi in rern cases, see A m m  Over- 
seas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne De Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 655 I2d 
Cir. 1979); Excel Shipping Corp., 584 F. Supp. a t  741; Republic National Bnnk of New 
York v. Ahmad Ladjevardi, No. 79-5203, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,1980) (v~hero there is 
no alternative forum lesser standard of minimum contacts may be applied); J.S. Service 
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do emphasize the lack of an alternate forum are not clear about 
whether the unavailable forum concept means the lack of an- 
other United States forum or the lack of any forum.108 More- 
over, we still do not know whether the new quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion is subject to a lower-level minimum contacts analysis.loO 
Nor have we yet been told whether the doctrine only affects tan- 
gible property intentionally brought into the state, or whether it 
can be invoked on the basis of intangible property, which is for- 
tuitously within the jurisdi~tion.'~~ Thus, the contours of the 
new quasi in rern jurisdiction are not apparent. 
,2. The Justification for the New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction 
in New York 
Despite its vagueness, there can be little doubt that the new 
judge-created quasi in rern jurisdiction gives New York courts 
greater power to regulate the reach of New York's extraterrito- 
rial jurisdiction than that which is provided under the state's 
long arm statute.17' Since the new quasi in rern jurisdiction is 
Center Corp. v. Banco Continental, 103 Misc. 2d 325,425 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. West- 
chester County 1980) (no alternative forum is a factor in quasi in rern jurisdiction 
analysis). 
le7 See, e.g., Banco Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank & Trust, 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d 
432, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984) (lack of alternative forum not explicitly considered). 
lee See, e.g., J.S. Service Center Corp., 103 Misc. 2d a t  328, 425 N.Y.S.2d at  947 
("The troublesome issue . . . is whether the Supreme Court [in Shaffer] meant no other 
forum in the United States or no other forum a t  all."). 
lee Several scholars identified this as a major post-Shaffer question. See, e.g., Silbcr- 
man, supra note 3, a t  68, 71-73; Riesenfeld, supra note 13, at  1198. However, the New 
York cases do not explicitly address this question. 
Although New York courts have not articulated a lesser constitutional standard for 
quasi in rern jurisdiction as compared to in personam jurisdiction, they have certainly 
permitted quasi in rern jurisdiction in situations where in personam is not available 
under the long arm statute. 
170 The case law on this topic is a t  best confused. Compare Feder v. Turkish AIt- 
lines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (quasi in rern jurisdiction upheld because prop- 
erty was tangible bank account with funds intentionally brought into the state) with 
Fine v. Spierer, 109 A.D.2d 611, 486 N.Y.s.~~ 9 (1st Dep't 1985) (quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion upheld when property attached was the nonresident defendant's unrealized interest 
in his mother's estate). 
171 In 1979 Professor Silberman saw three areas left open by Shaffcr for a state to 
use quasi in rern jurisdiction should it choose to do so: (1) where the facts standing alone 
are insufficient to support in personam jurisdiction; (2) where the property attached is 
traditional property such as real estate or bank accounts; and (3) where there is no other 
available forum. Silberman, supra note 3, a t  71-77. New York's vigorous use of the doc- 
trine overlaps with each of these categories. 
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New York is not totally alone in its use of the new quasi in 
rem jurisdiction. The next section considers the growing number 
of states that continue to use quasi in rem jurisdiction after 
Shaffer, and suggests that the New York approach provides a 
potential allure to that "silent majority" of states that have 
neither rejected quasi in rem jurisdiction nor currently use it. 
3. Other States that Use Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction After 
Shaffer 
In addition to New York, a number of other states use quasi 
in rem jurisdiction to obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents even 
after Shaffer. This use, although limited, might be an indication 
that the New York approach is beginning to have national influ- 
ence. Mississippi comes closest to following the path laid by 
New York. In Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund 
v. C o ~ l e y , ' ~ ~  for example, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in a 
sweeping opinion, upheld quasi in rem jurisdiction. Cooley in- 
volved a medical malpractice claim that arose in Louisiana. Ju- 
risdiction rested solely on the presence of the attached property 
in the state, much of it unrelated to the plaintiffs' underlying 
claim.17'j The property attached was the medical debt owed by 
plaintiff to the defendant, and the gate receipts due the defend- 
ant from a football game played in Mississippi by the defend- 
ant's team.lT7 
421, [I9841 N.Y. Laws 377 (McKinney Supp. 1990) (effective July 19,1984). The purposo 
of this law was "enhancing New York's position as a major financial and commorcial 
center by enabling i t  to develop a sophisticated system of commercial jurisprudenco." J. 
WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK PRACTICE $ 327.04 (Supp. 1988). The bill's 
sponsors urged its passage to preserve " 'the standing of New York as a cornmorcial and 
financial center."' Id. (quoting Sponsor's Memorandum in Support of Legislation 
(A.7303-A) (1984) a t  2). 
Administrators of The Tulane Educ. Fund v. Cooley, 462 So. 2d 696 (Miss. 1984). 
17% Id. a t  698. 
1 7 ~  The court held that the presence of this property, plus the defendant's substan. 
tial activities in the state were enough to subject i t  to jurisdiction over unrelated claims, 
The court's opinion was grounded in its awareness that the defendant, Tulane Univor- 
sity, was located "[als the crow flies, . . . less than a hundred miles from parts of . . . 
Mississippi . . . . Although the nerve center of Tulane's educational and service pro- 
grams is in Louisiana, the university has a variety of contacts with Mississippi and en- 
gages in a plethora of activities in and related to Mississippi." Id. at  699. This judgment 
was aided by the personal experience of the author who noted that on a day off from 
judicial duties he "personally witnessed the Tulane football team doing substantial 'busi- 
ness' in Oxford Mississippi as i t  defeated Ole Miss 26-24 in a miserable, drizzling rain." 
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Other Mississippi cases reveal that Cooley is not atypical. 
Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft C O . , ~ ~ ~  for example, allowed 
quasi in rem jurisdiction over a wrongful death claim arising out 
of a plane crash in Mississippi even though the property at- 
tached was completely unrelated to plaintifPs claim?7e Because 
the state's long arm statute did not apply, plaintiff would have 
been unable to sue in the state without attachment jurisdic- 
tion.lS0 Thus, the court used quasi in rem jurisdiction to fill a 
gap in the state's long arm statute.lsl 
Id. a t  699 n.2. 
With these substantial activities, the court had little diiculty in concluding thnt the 
m i n i m  contacts standard of International Shoe and Shaffer rins satisfied. Id. n t  701- 
05. 
603 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. hliss. 1985). 
17B Plaintiff attached debts owed Cessna by hli issippi  ahcraft denlers and flight 
schools for the sale or use of their products in the state. Id. a t  288. 
Is0 Mississippi's long-arm statute may only be invoked by plnintiffs tyho are resi- 
dents of the state. hfxss CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (1972). In Estate of Portnoy, the plnintS's 
husband was a resident of Pennsylvania who died while on a training mission to hw- 
sippi as a member of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard. See Estate of Porttzoy, 603 
F. Supp. a t  288. Accordingly, the state's long-arm statute was not availnble to.plaintiffin 
that case. The court did not consider the constitutional issue posed by o long arm statute 
that provides benefits to residents over nonresidents. See Bendii Autolite Corp. v. 
Midwesco Enterprises, Inc, 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (holdiig unconstitutionnl n state statute 
of limitations law that discriminated against nonresidents). 
lal The Portmy court cited one New York quasi in rem jurisdiction case, Intermeat, 
Inc v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978), thnt pioneered the use of this 
theory. See note 146 and accompanying text supra. 
L i e  New York, the Mississippi use of quasi in rem jurisdiction m y  not be limited 
to filling gaps in the long-arm statutes. In Universal Computer Sen%., I n c  v. Lyd, 464 
So. 2d 69 ( M i .  1985), the hl i issippi  Supreme Court upheld the seizure of an nutorno- 
bide as a means of adjudicating a suit for back wages in circumstances where in pemnnm 
jurisdiction seemed clearly available. In Lyall, the plaintiffI who was a resident of Missis- 
sippi, sued his employer, a foreign corporation, for back pay. The plnintiffa wages viere 
allegedly earned in h f k i i i p p i  so presumably suit could hnve been brought under the 
l o n g - m  statute which provides in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents who are sued 
for breach of "a contract with a resident of this state to be performed in wbole.or in part 
in this state." Mrss. CODE ANN. 3 13-3-57 (1972). 
Subsequent cases, however, cloud this picture. In Anderson v. S o ~ t  Explorntion 
Corp., 523 So. 2d 1024 ( M i .  1988), the state supreme court indicated thnt nttachment 
may not be authorized when in personam jurisdiction can also be obtained. This shift in 
attitude may have been influenced by changes to the state's attachment Inv~ rihich r;ns 
declared unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds in two opinions. hlPI I n c  
v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. h l i .  1978); hi issi ippi  Chem. Corp. v. C h e m i d  
Constr. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. h l i .  1977). There are strong indications in the 
MPI holding that attachment for jurisdictional purposes without n showing of n e d t y  
would violate due process. See hfPI, 463 F. Supp. a t  695. 
When the law was amended in 1982 in response to these opinions, a requirement W ~ L I  
Heinonline - -  55 Brook. L. Rev. 1 0 9 9  1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0  
1100 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55: 1059 
Utah also makes use of quasi in rern jurisdiction, although 
in a much different and more limited way. Rhoades v. Wrightle2 
was a wrongful death action filed by the family of a Utah farmer 
from the Utah-Colorado border area. The farmer had been mur- 
dered by a Colorado neighbor, on the Colorado side of the bor- 
der. The Utah Supreme Court permitted quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion to be used after nine years of litigation and several 
unsuccessful attempts to obtain in personam jurisdiction.lS3 The 
court justified quasi in rern jurisdiction based on the defendant's 
ownership and use of "decidedly tangible and immovable" prop- 
erty in Utah, the fact that "the prime issue" in the case was the 
defendant's continued right to use the property, and, most im- 
portantly, the fact that there was no other forum available to 
the plaintiff.lS4 The court stressed the lack of any other forum 
and the fact that quasi in rern jurisdiction was a "last resort" for 
the plaintiff.lS5 
added that the person seeking attachment specify in a pre-attachment affidavit why "tho 
complainants [sic] ability to recover the amount of his claim may be endangered or im- 
peded if the order of attachment is not issued." MISS. CODE ANN. 3 11-31-2(l)(a) (1982). 
If in personam jurisdiction is available, and if security attachment is not sought, but 
rather pure quasi in rern jurisdiction of the second type, it is difficult to see how this 
requirement can be met. 
lsz Rhoades v. Wright, 552 P.2d 131 (Utah 1976) (Rhoades I); Rhoades v. Wright, 
622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (Rhoades In. See note 183 
and accompanying text infra. 
IB3 The first case, a diversity action under the Utah long arm statute, was dismissed 
by the Tenth Circuit. The grounds for this decision are not given; the dismissal is con- 
tained in an unpublished per curium opinion. See 622 P.2d at  344 n.2. However, it can 
be surmised that in personam jurisdiction under the long-arm statute was not available 
since the killing took place in Colorado, and the wrong did not arise out of the defend- 
ant's ownership of property in the state. See generally UTAH CODE ANN. 3 78-27-24 to -28 
(1953). 
The plaintiff then filed state actions simultaneously in Utah and Colorado. The Col- 
orado action was dismissed on the ground that the state's statute of limitations had run, 
622 P.2d a t  344. In this procedural posture, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the uso of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction as the only means of providing the plaintiff with a forum for 
her claim. In the first opinion decided a year prior to Shaffer, the court upheld the use of 
attachment jurisdiction on Pennoyer grounds. Rhoades I, 552 P.2d a t  133-35. After 
Shaffer, the defendant moved for reconsideration, which triggered the court's second 
opinion. See 662 P.2d a t  344-45. 
Id. at  346-47. 
Ia5 Id. at  347. As the court explained: 
We are mindful that plaintiff has attempted to litigate her claim both in 
the United States District Court for Utah and the Colorado District Court. 
However, in neither instance was plaintiff permitted to reach the morits of hor 
claim. I t  cannot be denied that so far as this case is concerned, plaintiff has no 
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In addition to Mississippi and Utah, seven other states ap- 
pear milling to use quasi in rem jurisdiction. F l~r ida , '~~  Louisi- 
ana,fa7 North Car~l ina , '~~ and New Hampshirelse all have in- 
other available forum. 
Id. 
lB6 FTA STAT. ANN. 3 77.01 West  1967). In Wiggins v. Dojcsan, 411 So. 2d 894 (Fln. 
%ti. Ct. App. 19821, a Florida intermediate appellate court, over strong dissent, upheld 
the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate a clnim on a promissory note against a 
nonresident defendant. The court permitted the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction notwith- 
standing the failure of the plaintiff to attach the property. Although the court recognized 
that pre-judgment attachment has long been considered an indispensable attribute of 
quasi in rem jurisdiction, it dispensed with the requirement because i t  was fraught with 
procedural due process problems. Id. a t  895-96. 
The dissenting judge disagreed that attachment could be so ensily dispensed with. 
Moreover, the dissent read Shuffer as rendering "jurisdictional attachment Inrgely o b s  
lete in states such as Florida which have comprehensive long-arm statutes thnt encom- 
pass most types of minimum contacts." Id. a t  896 (Grimes, J., dissenting). The dissent 
objected to the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in this case when in personnm jurisdic- 
tion under the long arm statute was possible. To  permit quasi in rem jurisdiction the 
dissent wrote: "puts [the defendants] in a better position than they would hnve been if 
they had obtained personal jurisdiction." Id. a t  897. 
LA CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4850 (West 1966). In John v. Bmhmn Petroleum 
Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1220 (W.D. L a  1988), a federal district court upheld the use of qumi 
in rem jurisdiction against a nonresident whose only contact with the state was the precr- 
ence of the attached property. The defendant challenged the nttnchment on both prom- 
dural and substantive due process grounds. The court rejected both contentions. First, i t  
found that the procedural attack was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's 1915 opinion in 
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), which i t  held was "untnmished" by Fuentcu v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). John, 699 F. Supp. a t  1221. This conclusion is subject to 
serious question. For a discussion of Ownbey, and why i t  may not stand for the propmi- 
tion for which i t  was cited, see note 206 infra. Second, the John court held thnt the 
defendant's reliance on Shuffer was misplaced because the property nttached relnted 
to the claim. This far reaching opinion may presage the ushering in of n broad use of the 
new quasi in rem jurisdiction in Louisiana 
The North Carolina case is Canterbury v. hlonroe h g e  Hnrd~ood Imports 
Corp., 48 N.C. App. 90, 268 S.E.2d 868 (1980). In that case, both the plnintiE nnd de- 
fendant were nonresidents. The p1aint.W sold a quantity of lumber to the defendnnt, and 
a t  the defendant's request shipped i t  to North Carolina for processing. When a dispute 
arose about whether the plaintiff had delivered a sufficient amount of lumber, the de- 
fendant defaulted on the contract and the plaintiff sued attaching the property. Signifi- 
cantly, the plaintiff alleged that attachment was needed not only to obtain juridiction, 
but also to prevent the defendant from removing the property to "points unknonn." Id. 
a t  91, 268 S.E.2d a t  869. The court e m e d  dismisd  of the complnint on the ground 
that service of process was improper, but in dicta i t  indicated thnt qunsi in rem jurisdic- 
tion would have been proper in the case. The court grounded this conclusion on the c l w  
relationship of the property to the underlying controversy, the defendnnt's explicit direc- 
tion that the property be sent to the state, and the tangible nnture of the property. Id. nt  
93-95, 268 S.E.2d a t  870-71. 
The case may very well be atypical. N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 1-75.86) (1967) provides that 
a trial court has jurisdiction over any action "in which in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction 
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voked quasi in rern jurisdiction in the post-Shaffer period, 
However, courts in those states have stressed that the doctrine 
may be constitutionally exercised." The same statute, in addition, provides for quasi in 
rern jurisdiction based solely on the presence of the defendant's property within tho stato 
or the attachment of a debt owed the defendant in the state. Id. 5 1-75.8(4). But that 
provision, which sanctioned quasi in rern jurisdiction in the old fashion of Harris U. Balk, 
was held unconstitutional by the North Carolina Supreme Court immediately after Shaf- 
fer. Balcon, Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322,327,244 S.E.2d 164,167 (1978). In Balcon, 
which was the first post-Shaffer case decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court, the 
court went out of its way to disparage the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction despito tho 
legislative authorization for it. Indeed, the court applied Shaffer retroactively becauso in 
its opinion the free wheeling previous use of quasi in rern jurisdiction was "offensive!' Id. 
The court also held that, under Shaffer, jurisdiction was not proper in the case before it 
since the controversy "had no relation to the realty" attached. Id. 
After Balcon, North Carolina courts have continued to be chary in their npprovnl of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction. While they have authorized i t  for the determination of disputos 
in which the title or ownership of property is a t  issue, Lessard v. Lessard, 68 N.C. App. 
760, 316 S.E.2d 96 (1984) (entitlement to estate), or where i t  is used to adjudicate tho 
status of persons in the state, Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 70 N.C. App. 474, 319 S.E,2d 
670 (1984) (divorce proceeding), aside from Canterbury, quasi in rern jurisdiction usually 
has been denied. See Carroll v. Carroll, 88 N.C. App. 453,363 S.E.2d 872 (1988) (moro 
presence of property in the state in which the defendant may have an interest is insuffi- 
cient to support quasi in rern jurisdiction in an equitable distribution action in tho ab- 
sence of evidence that it was intentionally brought into the state); Cameron-Brown CO, V. 
Daves, 83 N.C. App. 281, 350 S.E.2d 111 (1986) (quasi in rern jurisdiction disnpprovod 
because the attachment of three checks owed to the defendant was not related to tho 
claim); Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Eways, 46 N.C. App. 466,470,472,265 S.E.2d 
637,640,642 (1980) (jurisdiction based upon the attachment of a "substantial amount of 
real property" insufficient to support quasi in rern jurisdiction because tho property was 
"too attenuated" to the underlying claim). But see Fraser v. Littlejohn, 96 N.C. App. 
377, 386 S.E.2d 230 (1989) (upholding quasi in rern jurisdiction when contacts with tho 
state are numerous). 
180 In New Hampshire, the case is Hall, Morse, Gallagher & Anderson v. Koch & 
Koch, 119 N.H. 639,406 A.2d 962 (1979). Hall was a claim by a law firm for the rocovory 
of a fee from a New Hampshire executor to prosecute a wrongful death action. When tho 
client hired other counsel who obtained a $250,000 settlement, the plaintiff's law firm 
attached the proceeds of the settlement. The court affirmed the use of quasi in rom 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, and held that the attachment of the sottlemont 
was "an added factor" in the minimum contacts analysis. Id. a t  644, 406 A.2d at  965 
(citing Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978)). Indood, 
the attachment provided the boost necessary to obtain jurisdiction since an earlier nction 
by the plaintiffs for in personam jurisdiction had been dismissed for failure to satisfy tho 
long-arm statute. 
Subsequent New Hampshire opinions do not reflect as expansive a view of tho pod 
tential of quasi in rern jurisdiction. See Altshuler Genealogical Service v. Farris, 128 
N.H. 98, 508 A.2d 1091 (1986) (rejecting quasi in rern jurisdiction sought by attaching 
the proceeds of an estate to adjudicate plaintiffs contractual claim for remunoration for 
locating heirs); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Abreem Corp., 122 N.H. 583, 449 A.2d 1200 
(1982) (no quasi in rern jurisdiction in dispute over a performance bond based upon 
attachment of real property in the state unrelated to the cause of action). 
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should be used sparingly.leO The remaining three states, Mary- 
land, Minnesota,le' and Penn~ylvania,'~~ each have laws which 
provide clear support for a post-Shaffer use of quasi in rem ju- 
risdiction. However, in none of these three states is quasi in rem 
jurisdiction actually in use.le3 
D. Overview 
In the decade since the landmark opinion in Shaffer, there 
have been two competing trends. On the one hand, the majority 
of states have either directly abolished quasi in rem jurisdiction, 
lm See notes 186-89 supra. 
lS1 In both Maryland and hlinnesota there is explicit post-Shoffer Icgislntion au- 
thorizing quasi in rem jurisdiction whenever it is constitutionaL In hiarylnnd, nttach- 
ment jurisdiction is authorized by statute whenever the debtor is a "nonresident individ- 
ual, or a corporation which has no resident agent in the state, and. . . (3) [tlhe action is 
any other in which the attachment is constitutionally permitted." hio. [CTS 6: JUD. 
PROC.] CODE ANN. 5 3-303(b)(3) (1957). hlinesota in 1981, apparently in respolm to the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), 
amended its attachment law to provide simply that "[alttachrnent may be used to obtain 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a party to the extent consistent with due process of Innt." 
I1IINN. STAT. ANN. 5 570.02 (West 1988). 
Nevertheless, despite the broad grant of authority, neither state hns reported opin- 
ions in which a plaintiff has successfully sought quasi in rem jurisdiction to obtain juris- 
diction, probably because both states have broad long-arm statutes &g qunsi in rem 
jurisdiction unnecessary. Both states, unlike New York, have long-nrm statutes that pur- 
port to rqch as far as due process permits. See, e.g., hb .  [CTS 6: JUD. PROC] CODE ANN. 
3 6-103 (1967, amended 1978);  INN. STAT. ANN. 5 543.19 (West 1957). See also Geelhwd 
v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220,352 k 2 d  818 (1976); State v. Continental Form, Inc, 356 N.W.2d 
442 ( M i .  Ct. App. 1984). Not surprisingly, therefore, in both states, there is authority 
for the proposition that quasi in rem jurisdiction is resewed for situations in which in 
personam jurisdiction cannot be obtained because the defendant cannot be located. 
Belcher v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 282 hid. 718,720,387 k 2 d  770,771 (1978) 
(Attachment proceedings "serve the purpose . . . of affording creditors tho opportunity 
to seize the property of a debtor who cannot be reached by service of process bemuse of 
nonresidence or flight."); Rice, Inc v. Intrex, Inc, 257 N.W.2d 370 ( h l i .  1977) (nttnch- 
ment used to gain in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporntion). 
le2 In Pennsylvania, a series of jurisdictional provisions passed in 1978, grant Penn- 
sylvania courts the power to adjudicate disputes even when there is no in personam ju- 
risdiction if the defendant has land, chattels, documents or stock certificates in the state. 
42 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 5302-5305 (Purdon 1978). There is some doubt as to the con- 
stitutionality of these laws. The Reviser's notes to these statutes indimto that they are 
patterned after a similar set of laws in hfichigan. The hiichigan lans, however, were 
struck down as violative of due process. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra. 
In addition, here, as in Maryland and Minesota, the act promises more thnn i t  appar- 
ently gives. There is only one reported case in which the statute was invoked. Sterling 
Box Co. v. Touretz, 585 F. Supp. 1230 (W.D. P a  1984). 
lS5 See notes 192 and 193 supra. 
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or while retaining the formal authority to use it, have allowed it 
to wither on the vine. This development has been accompanied 
by an expansion of state long-arm statutes, and a tightening of 
the procedural requirements for pre-judgment attachment. On 
the other hand, a minority of states, led by New York, continue 
to use quasi in rern jurisdiction, and have been vigorously ex- 
ploring a new and expansive role for the doctrine in the post- 
Shaffer period. Were it not for the latter development, one 
might conclude that quasi in rern jurisdiction is effectively a 
relic. However, the new quasi in rern jurisdiction offers an alter- 
native vision of the role of the doctrine after Shaffer. Given the 
energy and enthusiasm for the new quasi in rern jurisdiction ex- 
hibited by New York courts, it may capture the attention and 
support of the majority of states that have not yet formally abol- 
ished quasi in rern jurisdiction. The final section of this Article 
examines which of the two competing visions of quasi in rern 
jurisdiction is most appropriate for our time. 
Since the new quasi in rern jurisdiction appears to be win- 
ning adherents,lg4 it may represent the jurisdictional wave of the 
future. This is an important juncture, therefore, to examine the 
doctrine to determine whether it legitimately charts an appro- 
priate role for quasi in rern jurisdiction after Shaffer. This sec- 
tion undertakes that examination. The new quasi in rern juris- 
diction is premised on the notion that attachment jurisdiction 
can and should be used to judicially "fill gaps" left by state long 
arm statutes that do not extend as far as due process permits.lD0 
When this condition exists, the new theory opts for the use of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction rather than in personam jurisdiction,lDO 
lM See notes 175-92 and accompanying text supra. 
lBK See notes 142, 150-58 and accompanying text supra. Of course, New York courts 
themselves have not consistently adhered to this theory. Some courts havo authorized 
quasi in rern jurisdiction when in personam jurisdiction existed under the long arm stat- 
ute. See notes 159-60 and accompanying text supra. To  the extent that these cases au- 
thorize quasi in rern jurisdiction when there is no "gap" to fill, they lack any theoretical 
justification and may indeed be unconstitutional. See notes 206-22 and accompanying 
text infra. 
lea The choice of quasi in rern over in personam jurisdiction is not obvious. This ie 
so because i t  is no longer possible, as i t  was before Shaffer, to avoid the minimum con- 
tacts analysis of International Shoe by resort to quasi in rern jurisdiction. See notos 68- 
83 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, if quasi in rern jurisdiction is sought, it 
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provided only that the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction occurs in 
situations in which minimum contacts exist betnteen the forum, 
the defendant and the claim.1s7 The new quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion accepts the power of the courts to create new rationales for 
the doctrine without direct legislative action. 
This section demonstrates that there is no longer any valid 
theory for quasi in rern jurisdiction, and that it should be abol- 
ished. The new theory cannot withstand analysis for three rea- 
sons: (1) it is probably unconstitutional, (2) it  represents bad 
policy and is wasteful, and (3) it violates the doctrine of separa- 
tion of powers because the question of whether there is a "gap" 
in a state's long arm jurisdiction is to be determined by the state 
legislature, not the courts. 
A. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional Because It 
Deprives the Defendant of the Use of Property Prior to 
Judgment 
Quasi in rem jurisdiction requires the use of attachment of 
the defendant's property.lS8 In personam jurisdiction does not. 
must be in circumstances in which in personam jurisdiction also would be constitution- 
ally permissible. After Shaffer, both in personam and quasi in rern jurisdiction must 
comport with this constitutional standard. See notes 67-83 nnd occompnnying t a t  
supra. 
The one exception to this would be if there were a lesser due p r m  minimum 
contacts standard for quasi in rern jurisdiction than for in personam jurhdiction. Wide 
the possibility of such a standard developing after Shaffer was suggested by seveml com- 
mentators, see, e.g., Riesenfeld, supra note 13, a t  1203-0.6; Silberman, supra note 3, a t  
71-77, in the decade or more afterward, no court has indicated nny ~ ~ e s s  rvhntever 
to develop the thought. 
l* See notes 134-61 and accompanying text supra. 
lgs Professor Silberman has questioned this requirement. Silbermm, supm note 3, 
a t  46-47. She argues that i t  is the presence of the property within the state thnt should 
provide the predicate for quasi in rern jurisdiction not its seizure. It is true thnt without 
attachment the property may be disposed of prior to judgment. Horvever, the same p a -  
sibility of obtaining a worthless judgment exists with in personam jurisdiction. After d, 
there is no guarantee that the defendant will not disappear after service of proms. Since 
this possibility has never been considered sufficient to defeat in personam jurkdiction, 
Professor Siberman argues that i t  not defeat quasi in rern jurisdiction either. As she 
puts it: "The mere presence of property in the state should supply nn ndequnte bask for 
quasi in rern jurisdiction irrespective of whether the property is subsequently sold or 
otherwise unavailable as security for enforcement." Id. a t  47. At the time of Pennoyer, 
attachment was also thought necessary to provide notice to the defendnnt of the pen- 
dency of the action particularly since it was thought a t  the time that p r o w s  could not 
be lawfully served outside of the state. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878). 
But this rationale no longer holds true as process after International Shoe can be served 
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Attachment is a powerful remedy.lDB It is difficult to overesti- 
mate the disruption and mischief that an order of attachment 
can entail: 
Attachment n o t  only restricts a defendant's use of property; it also 
can cause a devastating impact  on a defendant .  . . . Attachment of a 
bank account may cause checks to bounce, enrage employees who can- 
no t  be  paid or otherwise disrupt ongoing business relations . . . . The 
disruption of business and acceleration of debts exert powerful pres- 
sure on the defendant to settle prior to any adjudication of the 
dispute.'OO 
When quasi in rem jurisdiction is used to fill a gap in a state's 
long arm statute, it allows the plaintiff not only to bring suit in 
extraterritorially. 
Nevertheless, attachment remains a firmly rooted, indispensable attribute of quasi 
in rem jurisdiction. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 76-77 n.8 (3d ed. 1986). 
But see the one reported exception to this rule, Wiggins v. Dojcsan, 411 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), discussed a t  note 186 supra. 
lee Kheel, New York's Amended Attachment Statute: A Pre-judgment Remedy in 
Need of Further Revision, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 199, 202 (1978). 
loo Id. Following Fuentes, many states amended their attachment laws to provido 
greater due process protections to defendants. In New York, for example, a threo-judgo 
federal court declared New York's attachment statute unconstitutional. Sugar v. Curtie 
Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), remanded, 425 U.S. 73 (1976). Thoro. 
after, in 1977, the legislature amended the statute to provide greater procedural protec- 
tions. The amendment provided for attachment without notice, but tho plaintiff must 
move within ten days after the levy, with notice as directed by the court, to the defond- 
ant and garnishee, for an order confirming the order of attachment. CPLR 6211(b). Tho 
plaintiff, in addition, must give an undertaking in an amount fixed by the court nnd not 
less than five hundred dollars, which will be paid to the defendant if the dofondant ro- 
covers judgment, or if i t  is finally decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to attach tho 
defendant's property. The defendant in such a case can recover all costs and damages, 
including reasonable attorney fees. CPLR 6212(b) & (d). Upon n motion to vacate or 
modify an order of attachment, CPLR 6223(b) places the burden of proof on the plaintiff 
to establish the grounds for the attachment, the need for continuing tho levy, and tho 
probability that he will succeed on the merits. These provisions, which apply to quasi in 
rem jurisdiction attachments, were inserted to ensure that New York was in complianco 
with these procedural due process requirements. 
In 1984, the legislature amended the attachment act to provide additional protoc- 
tions to defendants in quasi in rem cases. CPLR 6211(b), as amended, shortens tho time 
for service on the defendant of notice of the attachment from ten to five days. The ordor 
of attachment is to be vacated if the plaintiff fails to move to confirm, or to  apply for tho 
one extension permitted. The legislative intent in enacting these amendments was to 
bring New York's quasi in rem laws into compliance with Shaffer. See N.Y. Cn. PRAC. L. 
& R. 6211 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989) (Commentary). However, even with thsso 
safeguards, some have questioned whether the amendments to the New York Stato at. 
tachment law fully remedies the due process procedural problems identified in tho provi- 
ous law. See, e.g., Kheel, supra note 199. 
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the forum, but also to tie up the defendant's property through- 
out the litigation. In modern commercial or tort litigation this 
can result in seizure of substantial property.201 The availability 
of jurisdictional attachment can easily entice the most honorable 
plaintiff to use it as a security device, or to coerce the defendant 
into a settlement that could not be obtained without attach- 
ment.202 Given these problems, it is difficult to just@ quasi in 
rem jurisdiction when the sole rationale for its use is to obtain 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a ~ l a i m . 2 ~ ~  This is particularly so when 
one considers that in personam jurisdiction could just as easily 
be used to accomplish the same objective without any of these 
painful side effe~ts.~" 
Because of its dependency on pre-judgment attachment, 
there are serious,206 and as yet not fully explored,?OO constitu- 
In New York, for example, the values of attached property are often in the mil- 
lions of dollars. See, e.g., Cargill, I n c  v. Sabiine Trading 6: Shipping &., 756 F.2d 224 
(2d Ci. 1985) (two and one-half million dollar bank account); Tmpirnex Oil Limited v. 
Latina Trading Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (one nnd one-hall million dol- 
lar bank account); Banco Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank and Trust Co., 62 N.Y.2d 65,464 
N.E.2d 432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1984) (eight million dollar bank nccount). 
'02 Silberman, supra note 3, a t  59 11.132 ("[Tlhe advantage of tying up the defend- 
ant's property may make attachment an attractive alternative for n plnintif, nnd n Turk- 
dictional attachment' may permit a plaintiff to avoid the henring requirements or statu- 
tory limitations of some security statutes. At least one court hns winked a t  this 
subterfuge."); Zamrnit, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, supra note 26, nt 682 (“[Quasi in rem 
attachment] has been permitted under the guise of jurisdictional nttnchment when, in 
reality, its only purpose has been as a security device . . . .'3. 
With appropriate procedural safeguards i t  is not a due process violntion to use 
attachment for purposes other than obtaining jurisdiction. These purpases cnn indude, 
for example, attachment to prevent destruction or secretion of property. See notes 20% 
21 and accompanying text infra. 
2M As one commentator pointed out, attachment is not needed for jurisdiction 
"when in personam jurisdiction is available through the minimum contncts npprmch and 
service of process by the use of a long arm statute!' Comment, Q u a i  in Rem Jurisdie- 
tion and Due Process Requirements, 82 YACE LJ. 1023, 1032 (1973). 
The New York State Judicial Conference in its review of thnt stnte's nttnchment 
law observed that the due process issues involving nttnchment are "especially ncute" 
because: 
The property of the defendant subject to seizure in attachment unquestionably 
belongs to the defendant, not the plaintiff. It is not the subject of the action, 
and is related only peripherally to the plaintiff's clnim insofar ns i t  may prs- 
vide a basis for exercising jurisdiction and secure the enforcement of pEntiU's 
claim. 
N.Y. STATE JUD. CONP. REP. M THE 1977 LEGISLATURE IN -TION TO TItE ~ I Y I L  PRAmCE 
LAW AND RULES, in N.Y. LEGIS. D o c  No. 90, a t  250 (1977). 
Indeed, the Shaffer court itself carefully reserved tbis issue, Shaffer, 433 US. n t  
189, but curiously it seems to have been largely overlooked by litigants rind courts in the 
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tional problems that arise from the use of the new quasi in rem 
jurisdiction. There is little doubt that pre-judgment attachment 
implicates constitutionally protected property interests of the 
defendant.207 A spate of 1970s decisions by the Supreme Court 
teach that any state statute which permits the pre-judgment at- 
tachment of a defendant's property must serve some rational 
purpose, .and even then, the statute must provide procedural 
safeguards that precede the seizure.208 This is so because of the 
post-Shaffer era. It  is difficult to understand why courts and commentators havo not 
spent more time on this question. Perhaps they have been stymied by the Supromo 
Court's dicta in Fuentes that no pre-hearing requirement exists when attachment is 
sought for jurisdictional purposes since this use of attachment "serve[s] a most basic and 
important public interest." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67'91 n.23 (1972) (citing Owonby 
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921)). See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 
339 (1968). 
There are two reasons why the Fuentes dicta does not "rest . . . on a roasoned ox- 
tension of.  . . fundamental analysis." Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: 
The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355,366 (1973). First, Owenby, tho 
case relied on by Fuentes, was decided over two decades prior to International Shoe at  a 
time when quasi in rem jurisdiction still served an important role in alleviating the artifi- 
cial strictures of the Pennoyer doctrine. As Professors Clark and Landers point out, 
"Owenby might well have been justified in the Pennoyer v. Neff 'jurisdiction-is-powor' 
milieu, but that time has long since passed." Id. a t  367. 
Second, Owenby itself does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited by the 
Fuentes and Sniadach courts. Owenby involved a 1915 Delaware attachment law which 
not only permitted quasi in rem jurisdiction by attachment, but also required the de- 
fendant to post a bond before being allowed to defend the action on the merits. It was 
this latter provision that the defendant in Owenby challenged, not the unquestionod 
power, a t  that time, to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction through attachment. See Shafler, 
433 U.S. a t  194 n.lO. 
Nevertheless, the apparent approval of Owenby by the Fuentes Court has immu- 
nized the issue from sustained critical analysis. Even those commentators and courts 
that have examined the issue have not confronted the question head on, but have instead 
limited their focus to the far more narrow proposition of what kind of hearing is consti- 
tutionally required prior to the use of attachment for jurisdictional purposes. They have 
thereby lost sight of the larger question of whether in the age of full minimum contacts 
in in personam jurisdiction there is any need, with or without a hearing, for quasi in ram 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore, Procedural Due Process in Quasi in Rem Actions After 
ShafTer v. Heitner, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157 (1978). But see Bourne, The Demise of 
Foreign Attachment, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 141 (1987). 
20' See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing Corp. v. Di-Chem Inc. 419 U.S. 601 (1975); 
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
In Fuentes v. Shevin, the Supreme Court held that pre-judgment attachmont as 
part of a replevin action was unconstitutional in the absence of procedural safeguards. 
The Court, in imposing on the state the obligation to provide some pre-deprivation pro- 
cedure, made clear that the purpose of the inquiry is to "protect against arbitrary dopri- 
vations of property." Fuentes, 407 U.S. a t  81. The Court in its subsequent opinions "of- 
fected a slight retreat" on the precise procedural protections that must accompany tho 
seizure. Silberman, supra note 3, a t  56. However, i t  has continued to adhere to the fun- 
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basic due process principle that forbids the state from arbitrary 
deprivations of property.209 This right is broad enough to cover 
the temporary deprivations of property involved in pre-judg- 
ment attachment to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. As the Su- 
preme Court held in Fuentes v. Shevin, "[tlhe Fourteenth 
Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 
50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of prop- 
erty by the state is within the purview of the due process 
Although the state obviously has a legitimate interest in 
providing a means of obtaining jurisdiction in its courts,"'l quasi 
in rem jurisdiction is not a rational method for serving that in- 
terest, especially when in personam jurisdiction can be used for 
the same purposes. It is no answer to say, as New York courts 
have, that quasi in rem jurisdiction is needed to fl the gaps of 
in personam long arm statutes. These "gaps" represent volun- 
tary choices of the legislature. The gaps are not the result of 
constitutional limitations on the legislature that passed the 
acts.212 This justification for the constitutionality of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction, therefore, bootstraps the decision of the legislature 
to limit its long arm statute into a finding of constitutional ne- 
cessity for an alternative form of jurisdiction.21s One commenta- 
tor has bluntly characterized the argument for quasi in rem ju- 
risdiction when in personam jurisdiction is available as a "sham 
which should not be tolerated."214 
damental notion, underlying all of its opinions in this field, thnt the state may not nu- 
thorize arbitrary deprivations of property even if the taking is limited in time nnd scope. 
See generally North Georgia Finishing Corp. v. Di-Chem Inc, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (due 
process is needed to guard against erroneous deprivations of property); hlitchell v. 1V.T. 
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (procedures that minimize the possibility that property 
will be taken without justification are constitutional). 
See, e.g., L. TRIBE, A~IERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L IY 3 10-7 (2d ed. 1988) (The due 
process clause protects l ie ,  liberty, and property from "arbitrary government nction."). 
210 Fuentes, 407 U.S. a t  86. 
211 Id. a t  91 n.23. 
212 See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra. 
zlS As Professor Bourne has remarked, "[a] state which deliberately forgoes this SO- 
lution [providing full in personam jurisdiction in its long arm statute] is hardly in a 
position to say that summary deprivations are 'necessary to secure' jurisdiction b c a w e  
i t  could easily get jurisdiction without imposing such deprivntions." Bourne, supra note 
206, a t  168-69. 
2M Zammit, supra note 13, a t  18-19. See also Bourne, supra note 206, a t  163-65- 
Interestingly, one New York court in effect supported this point when i t  invdidnted on 
order of attachment to obtain quasi in rem jurisdicti~n over n. foreign corporation nfter 
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It is also no answer to say that quasi in rem jurisdiction is 
necessary to prevent the out-of-state defendant from fleeing, 
from removing property from the jurisdiction, or from secreting 
assets. If any of these factors can be established in a particular 
case, they justify attachment, not for the purpose of jurisdiction, 
but rather for These possibilities do not make quasi 
in rem attachment automatically necessary unless one is pre- 
pared to accept that these dangers are present in every case 
against an out-of-state resident who has property in the state. 
Plainly such presumptions are not accurate. The common sense 
observation that "[mlany defendants are simply too heavily in- 
volved in local affairs to pull up stakes and makes it lu- 
dicrous to argue that quasi in rem jurisdiction is necessary in 
every case to prevent a defendant from fleeing or removing as- 
s e t ~ . ~ ~ ~  The Constitution forbids such irrebuttable and discrimi- 
natory  presumption^.^^^ 
Finally, it is no answer to say that attachment is needed to 
enable the plaintiff to obtain an enforceable judgment against a 
nonresident defendant. For one thing, as the Shaffer court 
pointed out, the full faith and credit clause means that a judg- 
ment obtained in one jurisdiction where there are no assets to 
satisfy the claim must be enforced by other jurisdictions where 
assets exist.21e Thus, even if all nonresident defendants were 
tempted to remove their assets from the forum jurisdiction, the 
resulting judgments would still be enforceable. Furthermore, 
this argument suffers from the same impediments as the earlier 
argument that assumed nonresidents would always remove their 
the corporation qualified itself to do business in New York, and therefore bocamo subject 
to in personam jurisdiction. Brastex Corp. v. Allen Int'l, Inc., 702 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1983). 
215 The Supreme Court held as much in Shaffer. See notes 73-74 and accompanying 
text supra. See also Fuentes, 407 U.S. a t  92 (Statutes providing protections against do- 
struction or concealment of property must be "narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual 
condition."). 
2'e Bourne, supra note 206, a t  166 n.164. 
In Intermeat Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978), for 
example, "it was unlikely that the poultry company was going to abandon tho New York 
market to avoid suit in New York." Bourne, supra note 206, a t  166 11.164. Moreovor, 
even if this were not true, the argument for quasi in rem jurisdiction erroneously as- 
sumes that "such removal of property would necessarily eliminate jurisdiction basod on 
the earlier presence of property in the state, an assumption which is clearly illogical." Id. 
a t  167. 
218 See, e.g., id. a t  185-91, 206-10. 
218 See note 73 and accompanying text supra. 
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property to avoid jurisdiction. It simply does not accord with 
real world facts to treat "all nonresidents sued in a state's courts 
as presumptive absconders . . . . ,3220 
Thus, there is no legitimate governmental purpose support- 
ing the use of pre-judgment attachment solely for jurisdictional 
purposes. While there is contrary authority,2" careful analysis 
demonstrates that "both substantive and procedural due process 
require the elimination of quasi in rem juri~diction."~~~ 
B. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Represents Bad Policy and Is 
Wasteful Because It Invites Multiple Litigation on a Sin- 
gle Claim and Causes Unnecessary Satellite Litigation 
Because it has limited res judicata a quasi in rem 
judgment constitutes a wasteful use of scarce judicial resources. 
When quasi in rem jurisdiction is used, if the claim exceeds the 
value of the property attached, a successful plaintiff is not pro- 
hibited from N i g  a second action on the same claim to collect 
the difference. Moreover, a plaintiff who was unsuccessful in the 
first action, may try to establish liability in a new forum.224 For 
the same reason, quasi in rem jurisdiction often allows a defend- 
ant to file a limited appearance in the first action, and yet re- 
main free to relitigate liability in a second forum after losing the 
case in the first state.226 With an in personam action, by con- 
Bourne, supra note 206, a t  170. 
22' Id. a t  158 n.122 (citing cases). 
Zarnrnit, supra note 26, a t  683. For these reasons, several commentntors hnve 
suggested that the legislature can no longer constitutionally authorize qunsi in rem juris- 
diction pre-judgment attachment. See, e.g., Clark 6: Landers, supra note 206, a t  361; 
Zammit, supra note 26, a t  682-83. 
nS A quasi in rem judgment is limited to the value of the property attached. See 
note 8 and accompanying text supra. See also Comment, supra note 204, a t  1032 n.65. 
x24 This fact may encourage a p la in ts  with n weak claim to deliberately choose to 
"bring several quasi in rem suits, hoping to prevail in one." hloore, supra note 206, a t  
182. 
225 If the defendant chooses to appear without reservation, the resulting judgment is 
b id ing for the entire amount of the claim. F. J ~ a i ~ s  6: G. tIAZhRD, supra note 198, a t  
628. If, however, the defendant makes a limited appearance in the first action, the result- 
ing judgment is not res judicata for the reason that: "the court's authority is the prop- 
erty itself, the court cannot purport to determine the clnim itself; the judgmept deter- 
mines only whether the defendant retains the property [if defendnnt r;ins] or plnintia 
takes it [if pla in ts  wins] . . . ." Id. Accord RESTA~IEHP (SECOND) OP J U D C L ~ ?  5 
32(2) (1982). 
The more difficult question is determining whether issues litigated in a qunsi in rern 
judgment should be precluded in a subsequent action. The dnnger of doing so is thnt i t  
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trast, there can only be one action since the assertion of jurisdic- 
tion makes the defendant subject to liability for the entire 
Multiple litigation on a single claim might have been ac- 
ceptable before the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, but it 
is no longer tolerable because it is inherently unfair to both the 
plaintiff and defendant. The risk that a jury in a second action 
may return an inconsistent verdict renders the process unfair to 
a successful plaintiff. The unfairness to a defendant is similar, 
but also includes the burden of having to defend two actions not 
of the defendant's own choosing. It is precisely these twin disad- 
vantages that the res judicata rules are designed to preventaaa7 
gives the quasi in rern judgment "an added 'bootstrap' effectiveness in subsequent litiga- 
tion" that can be unfair when the defendant was granted a limited appearance. F. JAMES 
& G. HAZARD, supra note 198, a t  628. On the other hand, "if the determinations aro not 
given conclusive effect then the issues involved will have to be tried twice." Id. at  629. As 
Professors James and Hazard state, "there is no good solution to the problem which 
arises from the anomalous nature of attachment jurisdiction itself." Id. 
The position of the drafters of the Restatement of Judgments is that issuo proclu- 
sion will be invoked if the defendant made a limited appearance and contested the quasi 
in rern actions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 32(3) (1982). Others, howevor, 
disagree. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968) (no issuo 
preclusion when the first action was a quasi in rern case under the Seider doctrino); J, 
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 100, a t  600 ("It has been suggested that 
it is improper to permit such a judgment to have even collateral estoppel effect since 
that is inconsistent with the notion of a limited appearance and may be unfair."); Dovol- 
opments in the Law, supra note 40, a t  954-55 ("[Ilt seems fair that a plaintiff who has 
elected to take advantage of the quasi in rern procedure in a particular forum should 
thereafter be precluded by an adverse judgment, although a judgment in his favor would 
not bind the defendant beyond the value of his property."). 
In New York, the evident intent of the legislature in providing the right to mako a 
limited appearance to a defendant in a quasi in rern action was that tho judgment would 
have no issue preclusion effect. As Dean (now Judge) McLaughlin wrote: 
[I]t would be anomalous to hold that while the defendant may make a limited 
appearance, if he loses, that judgment may nevertheless be used offensivoly 
against him in a subsequent action. To  give the first judgment such sweeping 
effect would allow the defendant in the second action to litigate only tho qucs- 
tion of damages, his liability having been conclusively established. In practical 
effect, the first judgment would be virtually in personam. 
McLaughlin, Practice Commentary to CPLR 320(c)(l), CONSOLIDATED LAWS OP NEW 
YORK 381 (McKinney 1972). 
22s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982). 
The purpose of the res judicata doctrine is to "bring an end to controversy" after 
the parties have been given an opportunity with full due process protections to try the 
action once. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 198, a t  590. The reason for this is that: "a 
judgment would be of little use in resolving disputes if the parties were free to ignoro it 
and to litigate the same claims again and again." J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, 
supra note 100, at  615. It is true that according a quasi in rern judgment issuo preclusion 
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The heavy burden placed on the judicial system is another 
reason why the escape from normal res judicata principles per- 
mitted by quasi in rern jurisdiction fails to advance any legiti- 
mate state objective. In a time that is characterized by bur- 
geoning caseloadsZZB and shrinking resources, the res judicata 
doctrine limiting litigants to one bite a t  the apple is of "critical 
importance."22B Dean Carrington's observation that quasi in rem 
jurisdiction allows "a result very much a t  odds with the modern 
concept of res judi~ata"~~O is more painfully true today than it 
was when it was first made over a quarter of a century ago. In 
light of the free availability of in personam jurisdiction, quasi in 
rem jurisdiction should be rejected because it is a t  war with this 
fundamental principle of finality that undergirds modern civil 
effect would mitigate the problem of multiple litigation somewhot. However, a t  least for 
persons who file limited appearances, this is not a fair solution to the problem. The basis 
of a quasi in rern judgment, after all, is the presence of the property in the jurisdiction. 
If, however, full issue preclusion is given to quasi in rem judgments, thii rule would 
make a quasi in rern action into an in personam action with the added benefit of nttnch- 
ment. In effect, this would permit that which the state by labeling the proceeding q u a i  
in rem, purports to prohibit. As others have mitten, thii is simply unfair. See note 202 
supra. 
"B By some accounts, almost twelve million Ian-suits nre filed each year in the 
United States. COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN &IERICAN SOCI- 
ETY 2 (1982) (11.7 million civil cases were filed in general jurisdiction state courts in 
1976). In New York alone in 1987, over 3.5 million actions were filed in state court. 
Carlisle, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes Under New Yorh's 
Civil Practice Law and Rules, 54 BROOKLYN L REV. 95, 96 n.5 (1988). 
228 J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note lQQ, nt 615. 
Carrington, supra note 45, a t  314. 
This conclusion remains true whether or not a limited appeamnce is permitted in 
quasi in rern actions. As previously noted, a limited appearance is n provision that dlor;s 
a defendant in a quasi in rern action to defend the action on the merits without exposure 
to full in' personam jurisdiction. See notes 225-27 and accompanying t a t  supra. 
There has been much debate among scholars and courts ns to whether n "limited 
appearance" should be allowed in quasi in rem actions. Compare Note, "'Special" Ap- 
pearances to Contest the Merits in Attachment Suits, 97 U. PA. L REV. 403 (1933) (nr- 
guing that limited appearances should be permitted) uith Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem 
Under Section 1655, Title 28 U.S.C., 50 hlrcit L REV. 1, 22-24 (1951) (arguing thnt 
limited appearances should not be allowed because a trial of the clnim should fully deter- 
mine the contentions between the parties). However, no mntter how this debate is re- 
solved the irrationality of quasi in rern jurisdiction remains. 
If, on the one hand, a limited appearance is allowed, as is the w e  in most jurisdic- 
tions that have used quasi in rern jurisdiction, Developments in the Law, supra note 40, 
a t  955, then the res judicata problems already identified remnin. See note 8 and a w m -  
panying text supra. Since it means that the judgment will probably hnve no elnim or 
issue preclusion consequences, i t  "becomes a bonus to the defendant," thnt can be used 
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In addition to the limited res judicata effect of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction, these "antique categorizations also lack utility"a3s 
and efficiency because they "invite prolonged preliminary litiga- 
tion"233 on matters that are unnecessary to the just resolution of 
the claim. Before Shaffer, when quasi in rern jurisdiction could 
be invoked without minimum contacts analysis based solely on 
the presence of property in the state, even critics of the doctrine 
were forced to concede that quasi in rern jurisdiction had the 
virtue of simplicity of appli~ation.~~' However, the new quasi in 
rern jurisdiction, which of necessity must be based upon a mini- 
mum contacts analysis, clearly lacks this certainty. In fact, as it 
has been developed by New York courts, and by those few states 
that have passed quasi in rern jurisdiction statutes since Shaffer, 
every quasi in rern case is automatically turned into a constitu- 
tional case, forcing the court and the parties to engage in a com- 
plex search through the vagaries of that doctrine to determine 
whether or not jurisdiction is present.236 The search is even more 
as "an archaic shield" against liability for the entire amount of the claim. Comment, 
Shaffer v. Heitner's Effect on Pre-Judgment Attachment Jurisdiction Based on Prop- 
erty, and New York's Seider Doctrine: Have We Finally Given Up The Ghost of the 
Res?, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 323, 339 (1978). 
If, on the other hand, a limited appearance is prohibited, as some jurisdictions have 
done, Developments in the Law, supra note 40, at  953, then the res judicata difficulty is 
eliminated, but a t  an extremely heavy price. In this scenario, the state has effectively 
coerced the defendant into acquiescing to the assertion of full in personam jurisdiction 
over him because if he declines the chance to defend, he forfeits his interest in tho prop- 
erty that has been attached. And, a t  the same time, i t  has provided the plaintiff with tho 
unfair bonus of pre-judgment attachment which would not have been permitted had tho 
state forthrightly authorized in personam jurisdiction in the first place. 
232 Note, supra note 45, a t  1412. 
Zammit, supra note 26, a t  682. 
234 Professor Carrington made note of this point when he wrote: 
The most forceful argument for the preservation o f .  . . quasi in rem jurisdic- 
tion is [its] simplicity. Future lawmakers may conclude that our present effort 
to rationalize the choice of forum has failed: that the time and energy devoted 
to resolving disputes about fairness and accessibility are excessivo costs for tho 
benefits derived. 
Carrington, supra note 45, at  309. In Shaffer, Justice Marshall acknowledged this argu- 
ment, but rejected i t  because "the cost of simplifying the litigation by avoiding tho juris- 
dictional question may be the sacrifice of 'fair play and substantial justice.' That cost is 
too high." Shaffer, 433 U.S. a t  211. 
This is so because New York courts have developed the new quasi in rem juris- 
diction without any legislative direction. See notes 134-70 and accompanying text supra. 
Moreover, those states that have passed quasi in rern jurisdiction statutes since Shaffer 
have not specified any standards for its use other than a declaration that it is available 
whenever it is constitutional. See notes 191-93 and accompanying text supra. 
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difficult and wasteful here than when it is undertaken in an in 
personam case because if intangible property is the basis of the 
attachment, a court is also forced into the necessity of resolving 
questions that would never arise in an in personam case. These 
include such inquiries as determining the situs of the prop- 
e r t ~ , 2 ~ ~  and whether it has been brought into the forum inten- 
t i ~ n a l l y . ~ ~ ~  Arcane questions such as this, which can be avoided 
by in personam jurisdiction under a carefully defined long arm 
statute, produce a "substantial amount of uneconomic dispute 
not pertaining to the merits."238 
The determination of whether or not minimum contacts are present in m y  given 
case is no easy task, as any first year law student who hns struggled with the predictnble 
question on this topic in a Civil Procedure exam can attest. The Supreme Court hns not 
helped make the task any easier. The Court in its post-International Shoe cnses hns sent 
"mixed signals about how fairness and justice [are] to be determined." Greenstcin, The 
Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 I-kmh'cs U. 855, 
856 (1987). The decisions have been called "arbitrary." Jay, "hfinimum Contacts" as a 
Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction. A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429,464 (1981), 
"muddled", Sonenshein, The Error of a Balancing Approach to the Due Process Deter- 
mination of Jurisdiction Ouer the Person, 59 'haw. LQ. 47.53 (19861, and "grounded in 
faulty logic." Id. a t  57. One commentator has even compared the Supreme Court's mini- 
mum contacts jurisprudence to hfacduff's lament in Macbeth that "[c]onfusion now hnth 
made its masterpiece." Perdue, supra note 26, a t  479 (quoting W. SSHAKESP- hhc- 
BETH, Act 11, scene Ti). Courts, too, have criticized an approach thnt rnnkes every juris- 
dictional case into a constitutional minimum contacts case. See, e.g., Tnylor v. Para- 
mount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 1967). Nevertheless, some states, California 
being the best known, have drafted long arm statutes that provide for in personam juris- 
diction to the full limits of due process. See R CASAD, supra note 41, at 4-4 n.13. Thw 
statutes are subject to the same criticism that is now leveled ngninst the new q u a i  in 
rem jurisdiction. 
When intangible property, such as was involved in Shaffer, forms the property 
that is attached for quasi in rem jurisdiction, then the inquiry inevitnbly becomes on 
assessment of whether there can be a seizure "of something that can be seized only metn- 
phorically." Lowenfeld, supra note 13, a t  122. Determinntions of the situs of these in- 
tangibles "are even harder than the problems that [the Shaffer Court] nddressed in un- 
dertaking its new look a t  quasi in rem actions." Id. See also Developments in the h r ~ ,  
supra note 40, a t  955-56 (pointing out "the difficulty of determining rvhero properly is 
situated" for jurisdictional purposes). 
Thii is obviously an important question given the "purposeful avnilment" branch 
of the minimum contacts test. See generally Smit, supra note 13, a t  525 ("When n credi- 
tor does not control the movements of hi debtor, he connot fnirly be regarded ns hnving 
exposed to suit . . . the debt owed by the debtor. Therefore, in cases of transient in- 
tangibles the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction becomes particularly hnrd to defend.''). 
*" Carrington, supra note 45, a t  309. See also Younger, Quasi in Rem Defaults Af- 
ter ShaEer v. Heitner: Some Unanswered Qubtions, 45 BROOKLYN L Rev. 675, 677 
(1979) (pointing out that the minimum contacts standard of Shaffer "lncbs predictabil- 
ity. In cases of quasi in rem jurisdiction, lawyers henceforth wil l  need to worry nbout 
questions the mere asking of which would have been regarded ns excessively imogbative 
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Thus, the new quasi in rern jurisdiction doctrine lacks sup- 
port in wise public policy because it wastefully encourages mul- 
tiple litigation and preliminary litigation over unnecessary is- 
sues. For these reasons many thoughtful commentators have 
proposed its elimination even when authorized by the legisla- 
t ~ r e . ~ ~ ~  An additional oddity of the new quasi in rern jurisdic- 
tion, however, is that it has developed almost entirely without 
any legislative approval. The next section examines the signifi- 
cance of this fact. 
C .  Judge-Made Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Is Improper Judi- 
cial Lawmaking and Violates Separation of Powers 
The pathway for the new quasi in rern jurisdiction has been 
cleared largely through judicial decision-making by New York 
courts acting on their own without any legislative authoriza- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ O  Even if there were a continuing need for quasi in rern 
ju r i sd i~ t ion ,~~~  it  should not be judicially imposed. The funda- 
before ShafTer."). 
230 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 45, a t  321 (Quasi in rern jurisdiction is "out of 
step . . . with the modern quest for a fair forum . . . ."); Von Mehren & Trautman, 
supra note 40, at  1178 ("Ultimately, all that should remain of Pennoyer u. Neff, Harris 
v. Balk, and their progeny is specific jurisdiction to secure assets against dissipation and 
concealment while a controversy is being litigated in an appropriate forum."); Zammit, 
supra note 26, a t  683 ("The institution of quasi in rern jurisdiction has outlived its uso- 
fulness."); Note, supra note 45, a t  1424 ("The abolition of quasi in rern jurisdiction . . . 
would go far toward eliminating the unreasonable hardship imposed on the defendant by 
this rule."); Developments in the Law, supra note 40, a t  955-56 (calling for a unification 
of jurisdictional concepts because quasi in rern jurisdiction is "unrealistic and inadoquato 
. . ."). 
This is not to say that quasi in rern jurisdiction does not have any important rolo to 
play in the jurisdictional scheme when it is put to uses other than general dispute pur- 
poses. When quasi in rern jurisdiction is used for specific property purposos such as tho 
determination of title to a piece of property, or for attachment to enforce a judgmont, or 
as security for a judgment to be obtained when there are legitimate grounds for appro- 
hension that the defendant is about to abscond or secrete the property attached, thoro is 
not the same reason for concern. Indeed, the Shaffer court itself took pains to mako clear 
that its opinion was not disturbing these uses of quasi in rern jurisdiction. Shaffer, 433 
U.S. a t  208-09. 
240 See notes 133-93 and accompanying text supra. Although after Shaffer quasi in 
rern jurisdiction has been authorized by the legislatures of three other states, Minnesota, 
North Carolina and Pennsylvania, it has not been utilized in those states. See notes 188, 
191-92 and accompanying text supra. 
For the reasons advanced earlier in this section, quasi in rern jurisdiction no 
longer has a legitimate role to play in the determination of state court jurisdiction, See 
notes 198-239 and accompanying text supra. Assuming, however, for the purposes of 
analysis that it does retain contemporary validity, this portion of the Article maintains 
Heinonline - -  55 Brook. L. Rev. 1116 1989-1990 
19901 s NEW QUASI I N  REhf JURISDICTION 1117 
mental policy determination involved in jurisdictional matters 
ought to be, and historically has been, in the province of state 
legislatures, not the courts. 
There is a long-standing tradition in this country to leave 
the task to defining the contours of each state's extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the legislature. After Intermtional Shoe created 
additional possibilities for in personam jurisdiction over nonresi- 
dents, it was the state legislatures, not state courts, that decided 
what portion, if any, of that jurisdiction each of the states would 
claim.242 While this proposition has largely been assumed with 
little dis~ussion,2~~ the decision to assign the task to the legisla- 
tive process rests on sound principles. There are two reasons 
why courts should not be permitted to act alone in this field. 
First, the legislature has a greater ability to formulate rela- 
tively precise standards. Rather than being forced to formulate 
concepts on a case-by-case basis, the legislature has the ability 
to specify in advance the specific criteria that dl lead to a 
proper assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction.244 Without legisla- 
tive guidance, the courts are left with only the vague outlines of 
the minimum contacts, substantial justice and fair play stan- 
dards of the Supreme Court's decisions. Courts forced to rely 
entirely on such criteria are unable to give clear definition to the 
boundaries of a state's jurisdiction to potential litigants.245 
that this determination ought to be made by the legislntures not the courts. See notes 
242-74 and accompanying text infra. 
242 The legislative response to Intermtional Shoe is revealed in long nrm statutes 
which are now found in every state in the union. For a description of these lnr;r;, see R 
CASAD, supra note 41, a t  $8 7.01-9.12. 
24S This point is so obvious that i t  is often made almost without any consideration 
that i t  would be otherwise. An example is found in an exhaustive treatment of state 
court jurisdiction by the editors of the Harvnrd Law Review in 1960. Developments in 
the Law, supra note 40, a t  909. In that review, the authors mite "Within the limits 
imposed by the due-process and commerce chuses of the Constitution and by federal 
statutes the states are free to regulate the business of their courts. The state legislature 
must therefore define those situations in which its courts have tho power to render a 
judgment." Id. a t  998 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
A similar hesitancy to impose judge-made jurisdictional rules prevails in the f e d e d  
system. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolf 6: 60.. 484 U.S. 97, 109 (1987) 
(pointing out that "a legislative grant of authority is necesnry" for rules concerning ju- 
risdiction over non-resident defendants). 
244 Chase, supra note 13, a t  635 n.90. 
246 See note 235 and accompanying text supra. When courts nre left to themselves 
"to develop rules on the basis of only the most generalized standards," court-impsxd 
solutions mean that the essential element of predictability is largely lost. Chme, supra 
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The inevitable unpredictability that results when courts are 
forced to decide cases on the basis of vague standards is troub- 
ling on two counts. First, unpredictability increases the already 
high cost of litigation by encouraging court challenges to juris- 
diction. This is "especially unpleasant . . . when [these dis- 
putes] arise from a procedural rule; procedure is, after all, sup- 
posed to advance the goals of efficiency and fairness in litigation, 
not stand in their Second, vague standards impose an 
unfair and artificial barrier to business planning, which must in- 
evitably take into account the impact of jurisdictional rules on 
where a potential dispute might be resolved.247 
The New York development of the new quasi in rem juris- 
diction is a case study of the disutility of permitting the judici- 
ary to unilaterally develop this doctrine. The standards that 
have emerged from the cases are imprecise and conf~sed?'~ 
While legislation might not cure these uncertainties entirely, a 
carefully crafted statute could go a long way toward bringing 
greater certitude to the 
There are situations, to be sure, in which courts have devel- 
oped bodies of law based upon open-ended standards.260 In those 
situations, unpredictability is simply the price that our system 
pays for the benefits that flow from the judicial process. In addi- 
tion, even when the legislature does act, absolute predictability 
obviously cannot be achieved. Thus, unpredictability of judi- 
cially developed standards for the new quasi in rem jurisdiction 
is by no means a fatal criticism in itself. However, there is a 
second, and in some ways even more important, reason that 
courts should not blaze new trails with quasi in rem jurisdiction: 
the choices that are involved in forging the new doctrine are de- 
cisions that in a democracy should be determined in a represen- 
tative body rather than the courts. 
Procedural choices may seem "neutral," but they clearly are 
note 13, at 634. 
'* Id. at 635. 
Id. at 634. 
See notes 162-70 and accompanying text supra. 
This, of course, assumes that the legislature would choose after Shaffer to onact 
such a statute, and that it would be constitutional for it to do so. As discussed earlior, 
these are unlikely assumptions. See notes 198-239 and accompanying text supra. 
a60 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (Due process cannot bo 
defined with "exactness."). , 
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not. "[Mlore is involved in a change in jurisdictional reach than 
a reflection of changing te~hnology."~" Such decisions involve 
considerations of sophisticated social, economic and political is- 
sues. Does a state want to provide wide access to suits against 
nonresidents? Will doing so provide a benefit that it rrjshes to 
bestow on important commercial interests in the state?20a What 
dl be the economic impact on the judicial system for the state's 
taxpayers if one course rather than another is taken? The legis- 
lature can better "assemble and evaluate data that should bear 
on these issues, such as the questions about impact on commer- 
cial activity within the state."26s 
With quasi in rem jurisdiction, these questions take on an 
added dimension. Since, as a practical matter, quasi in rem ju- 
risdiction is only invoked when the defendant has substantial as- 
sets in the jurisdiction, the decision to permit its use, for the 
most part, benefits creditors.16Vroviding these creditors with 
another means, and possibly an additional forum, for pursuing 
their debtors puts a powerful added weapon in their arsenal. 
Quasi in rem jurisdiction offers creditors a greater choice of 
where to sue their out-of-state debtors, and a means of m g  up 
their debtors' property, even if it is not related to the claim. 
This is not to say that the choice involved in whether or not 
to provide quasi in rem jurisdiction involves pitting the econom- 
ically advantaged against the economically deprived. In the nor- 
mal quasi in rem jurisdiction case b0t.h participants have sub- 
stantial resources.266 The plaintiff cannot mount such a suit 
unless the plaintiff has the funds t.o hire an attorney who can 
find the defendant's assets and obtain an order of attachment. 
lS1 Chase, supra note 13, a t  618. 
2S2 This is apparently the policy choice that has been mnde by New York courts tbnt 
have used the new quasi in rem jurisdiction. See notes 175-85 and accompanying text 
supra. nThie this policy choice may be legitimate, i t  is one for the legklnture, not the 
courts, to make. 
25S Chase, supra note 13, a t  634. 
lM This normally occurs in commercial litigation, although omsiondly the new 
quasi in rem jurisdiction has been used in tort cases. See notes 175-85 and accompanying 
text supra. In a tort case, the plaintiff is a creditor only when seeking to obtain o j udp  
ment against the defendant. 
In Banco Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank and Trust Co., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 464 N.E.2d 
432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (19%). both the p la in t s  and the defendnnt were large mmmercid 
banks. The loan that precipitated the lawsuit totalled fifteen million dollars. This a e  is 
typical of the kind of litigation involved in quasi in rem jurisdiction dispute. See note 
201 and accompauying test supra. 
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Moreover, the effort is not worth the candle unless the defend- 
ant has resources worth attaching. Furthermore, since both sides 
need substantial funds, and since the claims involved are usually 
commercial, either side is as capable of becoming a creditor as a 
debtor. One can expect a certain amount of role-switching be- 
tween plaintiffs and defendants in quasi in rern jurisdiction 
cases.268 Thus, "attachment jurisdiction has been essentially a 
matter of intra-class, rather than inter-class, These 
policy questions are best resolved in the halls of a state legisla- 
ture rather than in the courtroom. A cardinal tenet of the Amer- 
ican political system is that political battles among equals, either 
of whom have access to political power, are best resolved in the 
political arena.268 Unless legislation intrudes on fundamental en- 
titlements or politically disadvantaged people, it is normally for 
the Iegislatures to set the agenda, not the courts.260 
Some might argue that the pre-Shaffer legislative authoriza- 
tion for quasi in rem. jurisdiction negates this point. However, 
this argument is misplaced since those statutes were based on 
the old understanding of state court jurisdiction developed when 
in personam jurisdiction was severely limited by the Pennoyer 
doctrine and when quasi in rern jurisdiction could be based on 
the mere presence of property in the state. The legislatures that 
passed these laws chose quasi in rern jurisdiction because it was 
a sorely needed method of providing a forum for plaintiffs who 
otherwise could not sue.260 The new quasi in rern jurisdiction, 
however, was created by the judiciary after all the ground rules 
had changed. Thus, the argument that these statutes represent 
the legislature's conscious preference for the new quasi in rern 
lne "Within the commercial establishment the same people who are somotimes crod- 
itors are often debtors in other transactions and, in general, are likely to hold proporty 
subject to attachment!' Chase, supra note 13, a t  620. 
la' Id. 
anB There is a respectable body of authority for the proposition that the judicial 
power ought to be reserved for the protection of those who lack access to political power. 
As one commentator pointed out: "[tlhis judicial obligation to enforce the rights of tho 
politically powerless is at  the heart of the American political system." Commont, Con- 
fronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Rule for Courts in Prison Rc- 
form, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367, 385-86 (1977). See also United States v. Carolono 
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-179 (1980); 
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 
1287 (1982); Swygert, In Defense of Judicial Activism, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 439,443 (1082). 
2n0 See note 258 and accompanying text supra. 
lao See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra. 
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jurisdiction over in personam jurisdiction cannot be taken 
seriously.261 
The New York judicial development of the new quasi in rern 
jurisdiction exempaes this unjustifiable abrogation of the legis- 
lative process. The only laws on New York books authorizing 
quasi in rem jurisdiction were passed h o s t  fifteen years prior 
to Shaffer.262 After Shaffer, the Law Revision Commission, the 
body charged with keeping New York statutes current, decided 
that fresh authorization for quasi in rern jurisdiction was 
needed.263 A bill providing for this was proposed to the legisla- 
Zel A statute has been called obsolete when the legislative intent that led to its pas- 
sage is no longer responsive to existing constitutional conditions. See G. CALABWI A 
Coaiaio~ LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). This condition can occur when, as is the 
case with old quasi in rern jurisdiction laws, the laws are "inconsistent with new cowtitu- 
tional developments." Id. a t  6. 
Ch. 308, [I9621 N.Y. Laws (eff. Sept. 1,1963). This law, d i e d  in CPLR 301, 
provides that: "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over person, property, or Status as 
might have been exercised heretofore!' CPLR 301. The legislative intent for this provi- 
sion was to permit state courts to exercise jurisdiction in the mnnner permitted prior to 
passage of the act. At that time, of course, quasi in rern jurisdiction was utilized with the 
Penmyer principles that were rejected in Shaffer. See notes 34-40,43 nnd nccompanying 
text supra. It is possible to read the words "as might have been exercised heretofore" to 
authorize the courts to use quasi in rern jurisdiction on a minimum contacts mther thnn 
presence theory, but this was clearly not the legislature's intention becnuse: 
Were this the intent, it would not have been necessary to drnft CPLR 302 
. . . . The Court of Appeals has expressly rejected the suggestion thnt the can- 
tacts theory now embodied in CPLR 302 could have been applied by the courts 
even before the enactment of the CPLR; major changes in the bases of juris- 
diction are, i t  has declared, legislative matters. 
J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL P R A ~ C E  8 301.10 (19WS). 
In 1978, after the Shaffer decision, the New York Law Revision Commission rec- 
ommended to the legislature that the CPLR be amended to permit the continued we of 
quasi in rern jurisdiction in conformity with that decision. The Commission, in its report 
to the legislature that year, stated that Shaffer "has deeply nffected attachment jurisdic- 
tion." Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the 1978 Lqislnture Relnt- 
ing to Revision of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Related Provisions in Artide 3 of the 
Civil Practice Law and Rules, [I9781 N.Y. LAW REV. C ~ h l b l ' ~  REP. 10. 
The Commission recognized that Shaffer upset "[a] cornerstone of the lnw of juris- 
diction . . . that a plaintiff could obtain quasi in rern jurisdiction by attachment in an 
action involving a cause of action having nothing to do with the object nttached." Id. nt 
12. The Commission stated that even before Shaffer i t  "was convinced . . . thnt attach- 
ment. . . effected a denial of,due process . . . ." Id. a t  13. However, the C o d i o n  
read Shaffer to provide some continued role for quasi in rern jurisdiction if i t  were b d  
on a minimum contacts analysis. To  establish this new w e  of attnchment jurisdiction, 
the Commission recommended that the legislature provide "guidnnce as to approprinte 
criteria" for the use of quasi in rern jurisdiction. Id. a t  17. 
The bii would have authorized quasi in rern juri~diction in conformity with the min- 
imum contacts analysis of Shaffer and Internotional Shoe. The bid listed the following 
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ture in 1979, but it failed to gain passage.2s4 The courts fash- 
seven factors for the court to consider in determining whether to issue a writ of pro- 
judgment attachment for this purpose: 
[I.] the plaintiffs relationship to the state, 
[2.] the relationship of [plaintiffs] cause of action to the state, 
[3.] defendant's relationship to the state, and 
[4.] any benefit accruing to [defendant] because of the relationship of his 
property to the state, 
[5.] the relationship of a garnishee, if any, to the state, 
[6.] whether the property is tangible or intangible and if tangible, whether i t  is 
permanently or temporarily located in this state, and 
[7.] whether there is another forum in which the plaintiff could reasonably 
pursue his remedy. 
Id. a t  17-18. For an in-depth analysis of the bill, see Chase, supra note 13, a t  627-37. Scc 
also Office of Court Administration, Legislative Memorandum S.2469, A.6836 (May 28, 
1980) (reviewing the bill and expressing the opposition of the CPLR Advisory Commit- 
tee on the ground that codification in the area is unwise "[ulntil the constitutional issuos 
have been further clarified" by the United States Supreme Court). 
The bill, Assembly No. 5836, passed the New York State Assembly on January 3, 
1979, but was referred by the Senate, Senate No. 2469, to its Codes Committeo from 
which it failed to emerge. REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE LEGISLATUIIE 
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 34 (Jan. 31, 1980). The bill was reintroduced in both tho 
Assembly and the Senate in the following term. See NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE R CORD AND 
INDEX, S.154, A.355 (1980). This time it failed to pass in either house. Id. While i t  was 
reintroduced in the Assembly the next year, i t  was not again considered by the Senate. 
See NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE RECORD AND INDEX, A.8 (1981). 
The rejection of this statute belies the argument that the old New York quasi in ram 
jurisdiction statute provided authority for the courts to fashion a new theory for tho 
doctrine after Shaffer. Although CPLR 301, which provides that New York courts "may 
exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property or status as might have been exorcisod 
heretofore," and CPLR 314(3) which allows service of process outside of the state when 
property has been attached, remain on the books, the clear intent of tho 1963 legislature 
that enacted these laws was to limit courts to using quasi in rem jurisdiction based on 
Pennoyer principles. See note 262 and accompanying text supra. 
The argument to the contrary is misplaced. That argument reads CPLR 301 and 314 
together for the proposition that the legislature condones any use of quasi in ram juris- 
diction that is constitutional. These statutes were initially passed in 1963 a t  a timo when 
quasi in rem jurisdiction could be obtained constitutionally whenever there was property 
in the jurisdiction that was attached. See notes 27-63 and accompanying text supra. 
Nevertheless, the argument asserts that constitutional changes since that time do not 
affect the meaning of the statute. All that has changed in the intervening years, tho 
argument runs, is that the constitutional basis for assessing the validity of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction has changed; legislative permission for its use remains. 
Despite the superficial appeal of this argument it is seriously flawed. CPLR 301 wae 
specifically designed to permit courts to assert jurisdiction in the ways that they had in 
the past before International Shoe made possible the Gse of long arm jurisdiction. Sce 
notes 40-42,44 and accompanying text supra. I t  is specifically limited to that use. Undor 
this arrangement the legislature used CPLR 302 to express its views about the use of tho 
state's new powers to extend its judicial power to include persons who establish "mini- 
mum contacts" with the state while a t  the same time codifying the older Pennoycr 
"presence" basis of jurisdiction in CPLR 301. A key purpose of this limitation is to make 
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ioned the new quasi in rem jurisdiction despite this legislative 
rejection of a bill providing for a post-Shaffer use of the doc- 
trine.266 Thus, the effect of the New York court decisions creat- 
ing the new quasi in rem jurisdiction is not only to embrace a 
concept that the legislature has rejected, but to amend the 
state's long arm statute. The practical consequence of these de- 
cisions is to expand the state's long arm jurisdiction to areas 
that were deliberatelyoleft uncovered by the state legislat~re.2~~ 
This might be tolerable if the legislature had defaulted by 
not making any effort to keep the long arm statute current in 
light of changing technology and constitutional developments, or 
if the legislature had explicitly delegated responsibility for main- 
taining the currency of its long arm statute to its c0urts.2~~ In 
New York neither condition is true. The legislature has taken 
seriously its responsibility for keeping the long arm statute cur- 
rent. In the quarter century since the long arm statute rras first 
passed in 1963, the New York State legislature has amended it 
clear that it is the legislature's province to decide how much of the new posibiiities for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction i t  wished to take, while a t  the same time preserving whnt the 
judiciary done has done before. 
The scheme set up in CPLR 301 and 302, therefore, foreclosed the pmibiity thnt 
courts acting alone would create uses for the minimum contacts d p i s  that were not 
covered by CPLR 302. J. WEINSTEIN, H.KORN & A. ~~ILLER, supra note 262, nt  3 301.10 
('Were the [contrary the] intent [of CPLR 3011, i t  would not hnve been neceswy to 
draft CPLR 302. . . ."). Thus, the only plausible meaning of the words "as might hnve 
been exercised heretofore" as applied to quasi in rern jurisdiction is that i t  refers to the 
old, and now discredited, pre-Shaffer method of obtaining qunsi in rern jurisdiction. The 
only way to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction after Sholfer, however, is through minimum 
contacts analysis. It is precisely this new way of using the state's poser thnt the legisln- 
ture reserved to itself. CPLR 301, thus, cannot be understood as giving a t e  blnnche to 
the judiciary to create the new quasi in rem jurisdiction. Under the scheme established 
by the legislature twenty-five years ago, if New York is to have a new qunsi in rern juris- 
diction i t  should be a legislative, not a judicial, creation. 
266 See note 264 and accompanying text supra. 
286 Examples include Intermeat v. American Poultry, 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); 
a1mo E Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); and Bmco Ambrrr' 
Artoc Bank and Trust Co., 62 N.Y.2d 65,464 N.E.2d 432,476 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1954). See 
notes 134-46 and accompanying text supra. 
967 The California long arm statute is a model of this type of statute. It provides for 
long arm jurisdiction to the limit of the due process clause. While n statute of thnt an- 
ture h& all  the difficulty described in the discussion of the unpredictability thnt results 
when courts are left a t  sea to adjudicate in a standardless field, see note 235 and nccom- 
panying text supra, i t  a t  least legitimizes judicial activity in the development of the law. 
The New York legislature, however, has not opted for the Cnlifornin npprcach, See notes 
134-58 and accompanying text supra. 
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five times.26s Each amendment was preceded by careful study by 
the New York State Judicial Conference or by the Law Revision 
Commis~ion.~~~ While these amendments are certainly subject to 
criticisrn,2?O one cannot plausibly argue that the legislature has 
defaulted in its oversight of that law. Moreover, in not one of its 
amendments to the law has the legislature delegated sole re- 
sponsibility to the courts to fashion the contours of the law. 
The New York courts' boldness in inventing a new role for 
quasi in rem jurisdiction in the face of legislative occupation of 
the field is particularly perplexing when one contrasts it with the 
courts' approach to in personam jurisdiction. In that area New 
York courts have expressly deferred to the legislature, noting its 
superior ability to fix precise jurisdictional rules. In Simonson V .  
International Bank??' for example, the New York Court of Ap- 
peals, after International Shoe, refused to permit jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation under circumstances not authorized 
by statute for the following reasons: 
There can be no doubt that International Shoe Co. . . . opened n 
broad, largely undefined area for state exercise of jurisdiction over for- 
eign corporations. (citing authority) The standard declared in those 
cases, of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice", is 
itself, at  best, rather vague and nebulous. The formulation of specific 
rules to implement such a standard seems more appropriately the 
function of the Legislature than of the courts. There is the added con- 
sideration that legislation, as distinguished from judicial revision, is 
the more suitable vehicle for fixing precise jurisdictional guidelines for 
the future; only through such legislation may foreign corporations be 
put on notice that they run the risk of being exposed to suit here 
Ch. 590, f 1, [I9661 N.Y. Laws 1347 (adding a new provision t o  CPLR  302(a) t o  
cover tortious acts outside the state that cause injury within the state); Ch. 859, 1, 
[I9741 N.Y. Laws 2121 (adding a new subdivision t o  CPLR 302(b) t o  cover matrimonial 
actions); Ch. 252, 33 1, 2, [I9791 N.Y. Lavfe 482 (enlarging the transaction o f  business 
test o f  CPLR 302(a)(l)  to cover persons who contract out o f  state t o  provide goods or 
services in the state); Ch. 281, f 22, [I9801 N.Y. Laws 444 (amending the matrimonial 
provision o f  CPLR 302(b) t o  conform to divorce reform legislation); Ch. 505, f 1, [I9821 
N.Y. Laws 1428 (amending the matrimonial section o f  CPLR  302(b)). 
280 See, e.g., Reese, A S tudy  of CPLR 302 in Light of Recent Judicial Decision, 
ELEVENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE (1966); Note, supra note 45. 
Z70 See, e.g., Homburger, The  Reach of New York's Long Arm Statute: Today and 
Tomorrow, 15 BUFFALO . REV. 61 (1965); Note, New York's Long-Arm Jurisdiction: The  
Case for the Agent Plaintiff, :1 BROOKLYN L. REV. 625 (1975); Comment, The  Long Arm 
and Multiple Defendants: The  Conspiracy Theory of i n  Personam Jurisdiction, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 506 (1984). 
14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964). 
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For over twenty-five years, New York courts have continued to 
adhere to the view that the reach of that state's long arm juris- 
diction is a matter for the State House, not the courthouse. Just 
two years ago, for example, in Talbot u. Johnson Newspaper 
C0rp.,2?~ the court rejected an attempt to assert long arm juris- 
diction over a California defendant in a defamation case even 
though it might have been constitutional to do so, because juris- 
diction was not provided in the state's long arm 
This long-standing, and quite appropriate deference to the 
legislature, makes the New York courts' invention of the new 
quasi in rem jurisdiction incongruous, considering that it is 
based on a "gap" in the state's long arm statute. The incon- 
gruity is especially alarming since the "gap" is created by the 
legislature's considered judgment to limit the reach of its juris- 
diction, a judgment that the New York courts have professed to 
adhere to conscientiously. 
Thirteen years after Shaffer v. Heitner, a new brand of 
quasi in rem jurisdiction is emerging. Invented by the New York 
courts, the concept has so far attracted the approval of only a 
few states. However, given the prestige and influence of the New 
York Court of Appeals276 and the United States Court of Ap- 
272 Id. a t  287-88, 200 N.E.2d a t  430, 251 N.Y.S.2d a t  438 (citations omitted). 
275 71 N.Y.2d 827, 522 N.E.2d 1027, 527 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1988). 
274 Id. a t  829-30, 522 N.E.2d a t  1028-29, 527 N.Y.S.2d a t  730-31. 
Deference to the legislature has been a consistent theme in civil prmdure mnttels 
in New York, except for the curious exception c m e d  out for the new q u a i  in rem juris- 
diction. With statutes of limitations, for example, the New York Court sf Appeals has 
held that the legislature is "better suited to change the rule" even though old legislation 
mandated that a plaintiffs cause of action in a toxic tort case was destroyed because tho 
statute applied from the date of last exposure, not the date of discovery. Fnrrell, Ciuil 
Practice, 33 SYRACUSE L. R V. 31.33 (1982). In 1981, the legislature after prodding by the 
court, see, e.g., Thomton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1Q02, 417 
N.Y.S.2d 920 (19791, responded by amending the low. See CPLR 214-b (hlcKinney 
Supp. 1981). 
ns See, e.g., F. BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPELUS, 1847- 
1932 248 (1985) (referring to the "prestige of the New York Court of Appeols n. a mm- 
mon law tribunal"); R JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT w THE AMERICAN SY- OF GOV- 
ERNMENT 54 (1955) (describing the New York Court of Appeals as a "great mmmon h w  
court"). 
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peals for the Second Cir~uit,2'~ it cannot be ignored and could in 
the near future win the acceptance of other states. 
While a few states have explicitly rejected the concept, most 
states have not. In these jurisdictions, quasi in rern jurisdiction 
is not actively used, but it has not been officially buried. These 
states may be influenced by the new approach. Other states have 
passed legislation providing for quasi in rern jurisdiction but 
have not made use of it; these states may also come into the 
orbit of the new quasi in rern jurisdiction. In the aftermath of 
Shaffer v. Heitner, which put the doctrine of quasi in rern juris- 
diction on an equal footing with in personam jurisdiction, this 
development is both surprising and troubling. After Shaffer, 
there is no longer any sound reason for continuing to use quasi 
in rern jurisdiction. 
Quasi in rern jurisdiction is an idea whose time has gone; it 
should fade from the jurisdictional landscape. The rationales of- 
fered for the new quasi in rern jurisdiction cannot withstand se- 
rious scrutiny. The new quasi in rern jurisdiction is based on the 
fallacious notion that attachment jurisdiction can usefully fill 
"gaps" in state long arm statutes. But any gaps that exist can 
easily be plugged by the simple expedient of amending the long 
arm statute itself. By doing so, rather than relying on quasi in 
rern jurisdiction which requires the attachment of property prior 
to any judicial determination of liability, a state can legitimately 
advance the interests associated with extraterritorial jurisdiction 
without intruding on the property interests of nonresident de- 
fendants. The new quasi in rern jurisdiction also unnecessarily 
complicates litigation by creating a ground for pretrial motions 
and hearings directed at the propriety of the attachment and by 
opening up possibilites of multiple litigation of the same claim. 
In addition, it adds an unneeded club for plaintiffs who might be 
tempted to use attachment not to obtain jurisdiction otherwise 
denied them, but to coerce settlements from nonresident de- 
fendants. Finally, the new quasi in rern jurisdiction developed by 
New York courts seriously intrudes on the legitimate preroga- 
See, e.g., Gould, Book Review, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 20, 1989, at 2, col. 3 (reviewing J. 
MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1989)) (''[Nlo one can deny that tho 
quality of its judges, the richness of its contributions to American Jurisprudence, tho 
historical significance of its decisions, have elevated the Second Circuit far above paro- 
chial significance into a tribunal that enjoys an awesome respect throughout that land."). 
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tives of the legislature and fosters the uncertainties that often 
accompany judge-made law. 
While these costs might have been worth the benefits of 
providing quasi in rem jurisdiction in an earlier day when there 
were serious practical and doctrinal impediments to the use of in 
personam jurisdiction over nonresidents, such conditions no 
longer exist. The use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in our time, 
whether new or old, is irrational, and very possibly unconstitu- 
tional. The overture of the New York courts to develop a new 
role for quasi in rem jurisdiction should be regarded for what it 
is: a siren call to return to the past. 
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